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¶1 The logic of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969) has been widely 
acknowledged as fatally flawed for a generation.  Yet, the verdict enjoys a rich and 
rewarding existence in the afterlife.  In amicus briefs in Fox Television Stations v. FCC 
(2009), a case dealing with the government’s ability to censor broadcast television, 
parties favoring greater federal control over mass media insisted that the Supreme Court 
leave precedent as is.  “Questioning Red Lion, even in dicta, could upset all broadcast 
ownership limits, broadcast must-carry rights, spectrum build-out provisions, political 
content obligations, and the wide range of spectrum policy decisions,” pleads one from 
Free Press.  Conversely, advocates for free speech, including the American Civil 
Liberties Union, argued that Red Lion is ripe for reappraisal.  
¶2 This Article seeks to demonstrate the constitutional imperative of the latter 
position.  The Red Lion verdict, following U.S. v. NBC (1943), crafted two First 
Amendments: newspapers bask in warm, bright, sunshine, strongly protected from 
regulation; broadcast media lurk in the shadows of “public interest” licensing.  Delivery 
paths delineated.  Due to the “physical scarcity” of the radio signals transporting content 
to audiences, broadcast speech was subject to editorial controls.  The scarcity the Court 
identified was not, after all, unique or physical, but economic and market-wide.  
Newspapers and radio stations all use inputs having opportunity costs. 
¶3 The split regime is no longer just a curious historical artifact.  Technological 
convergence has obliterated even misperceived lines of demarcation.  The New York 
Times is a newspaper but is delivered to readers via electronic data networks.  If free 
speech rights tie to delivery path, then all media can be licensed and regulated in the 
Wireless Age.  Yet, this has not yet obtained; indeed, the Court has held—notably in 
Playboy and Reno—that speech via computer networks (“spectrum in a tube”) is 
protected via the strict scrutiny extended print media.  Whatever the lines of Red Lion, 
the Court today means something quite different when looking at new media. 
¶4 This is why interests desiring enhanced regulation of electronic speech zealously 
guard the corpse of Red Lion.  The policy cannot be justified on a social cost-benefit 
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calculus or via First Amendment jurisprudence, yet it lingers in the mist of “physical 
scarcity.”  Yet, as today’s communications stream through the air, coaxial cables, copper 
twisted pairs, fiber optics, satellite beams, or bounce off cellular base stations, that cloud 
must lift for the First Amendment to assume its proper role in protecting free speech.  It is 
time for Red Lion to rest in peace.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
“When I die—if I die—I want to be buried in Louisiana, so I can stay active in 
politics.” 
—Earl Long (1895-1960), Governor of Louisiana 
¶5 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC1 authorized a bifurcated First Amendment.  
Because TV and radio broadcasters distributed their content using “physically scarce” 
airwaves, the government was empowered to license and regulate such organs of the 
press.  This level of state control was, conversely, barred for newspapers, magazines, or 
book publishing—businesses using paper to communicate ideas.  The Court had 
determined that the medium was indeed the First Amendment message.   
¶6 Alas, the 1969 decision in Red Lion displays rampant confusion over economics2 
and radio technologies.3  Its flawed reasoning has been widely acknowledged for a 
generation.4  It has left a very messy jurisprudence covering content-based regulation of 
over-the-air broadcast speech.5  Yet, almost as if enjoying a rich and rewarding existence 
in the afterlife, Red Lion not only continues to supply legal justification for ongoing 
regulation, but provides a path for the design of rules governing the digital future.6  
 
1 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (“In view of the scarcity of broadcast 
frequencies, the Government’s role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those 
unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expressions of their views, 
we hold the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional.”). 
2 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).  Coase’s article, 
debunking the flawed economic analysis of NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (“NBC”), made no impact on 
the Red Lion court, which premised its constitutional approval of content-based regulation in broadcasting 
on the same empty “physical scarcity” logic.   
3 Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
905 (1997). 
4 See Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School, Plenary Address: Freedom of Speech and 
Press in the 21st Century: New Technology Meets Old Constitutionalism at the Progress & Freedom 
Foundation, Aspen Summit, 14:45–18:04 (Aug. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/pff/070819/.  Professor Tribe presents an articulate exposition of 
constitutional principles underlying this analysis, with a case study addressing risks of regulation on violent 
speech for the protection of children.   
5 David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 214 
(1975); Bruce M. Owen, Differing Media, Differing Treatment? Radio and Television, in FREE BUT 
REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW 35–51 (Daniel L. Brenner & William L. Rivers 
eds., 1982); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1984); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN 
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994).   
6 An important symposium convened on April 18, 2008 to discuss the purposes of Red Lion and its 
application to the digital media economy.  The symposium agenda is available online, 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2008/documents/01-RedLionSymposium-Agenda.pdf, with 
scholarly articles published as Symposium: Does Red Lion Still Roar? Public Interest Media Regulation 
 52
Vol. 9:3] Thomas W. Hazlett et al. 
¶7 Red Lion’s continued influence is curious for multiple reasons.  First, there is the 
dubious logic of Red Lion.  Second, marketplace evolution is producing tumult in media 
business models.  Whatever the Court thought it knew about communications technology 
in 1969 is self-evidently wrong today.  As newspapers deliver content to readers via 
wireless connections, or broadcasters stream video to broadband subscribers via Internet 
connections, transmission paths—whose distinct qualities form the basis of Red Lion’s 
distinction between the two First Amendments—converge.  The print versus broadcast 
demarcation is erased.   
¶8 Third, this market evolution features a pronounced shift away from terrestrial 
broadcasting.  In the world of 1943 to 1969, radio and then television broadcasters were 
perceived as powerful, perhaps dominant players in the media landscape.  Today’s media 
marketplace offers, however, quite a different picture.7  Close to ninety percent of U.S. 
households subscribe to cable or satellite subscription services for the video 
transmissions, not local TV stations licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).8  Radio stations are being similarly eclipsed by satellite, on the one 
side, and web-connected audio devices (MP3 players and cellphones, e.g.) on the other.  
Not only do the broadcast media appear to be just one set of rivals competing for 
audience share, they often use the very same wireless delivery systems employed by 
alternative media governed under a different First Amendment.  
¶9 The lack of a proper burial for Red Lion is cause for alarm.9  In amicus briefs for 
Fox Television Stations v. FCC,10 a case where a broadcaster contested FCC fines for 
programs deemed “indecent,” many advocacy groups insisted that the Court leave Red 
Lion undisturbed: “Questioning Red Lion, even in dicta, could upset all broadcast 
ownership limits, broadcast must-carry rights, spectrum build-out provisions, political 
content obligations, and the wide range of spectrum policy decisions.”11  On the opposing 
 
Forty Years After Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 767 (2008) [hereinafter Red Lion 
Symposium].  See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.  “It is quite possible that what we should do now 
is nothing.  It will be most intriguing to hear what the panelists have to say about ways of reviving Red 
Lion's admirable ends in a communications universe where Red Lion's means are most ill-suited.”  Cass 
Sunstein, Keynote Address, Red Lion Symposium, at 778.  “One question is whether a great deal can be 
done privately, not publicly.  Two little ideas with respect to private solutions might emerge spontaneously, 
or may be encouraged through purely moral suasion by the FCC.”  Id. 
7 Harry A. Jessell, Hundt Comes Clean: Internet Trumps TV, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2010/03/12/daily.4/ (describing former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt’s 
remarks on the public interest in promoting the Internet over broadcast TV). 
8 Almost 87 percent of TV households, or 95.8 million TV households, subscribe to an MVPD service, 
consisting of 68.2 percent cable TV and 29.2 percent satellite (DBS) TV as of June 2006.  See FCC, IN THE 
MATTER OF ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE 
DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING: THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 5, MB Docket No. 06-189, FCC 07-
206 (FCC Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-
206A1.doc. 
9 Amici in the FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. litigation emphasized the same danger posed by 
advocates suggesting expansion of content-based restrictions.  See, e.g., Brief for Time Warner Inc. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) 
(No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3285395, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-
08/07-582_RespondentAmCuTimeWarner.pdf. 
10 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), remanded to 613 F.3d 317, 334 (2d Cir. 
2010) (vacating the FCC’s order and indecency policy). 
11 Brief of Free Press, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, New America Foundation, 
Participatory Culture Foundation, Cuwin Foundation, Ethos Group, Acorn Active Media Foundation, 
FreeNetworks.Org, Monroe Price, Susan Crawford as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6, FCC v. 
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side, advocates for free speech rights, such as the Progress and Freedom Foundation,12 
former FCC members Newton Minow and Glen Robinson,13 and the American Civil 
Liberties Union,14 argued that the regulatory approach of Red Lion and the related 
Pacifica verdict are ripe for reappraisal.15  This Article takes and develops the latter 
position.  There are at least four important sets of reasons to reconsider Red Lion’s legal 
rationale allowing licensing of the electronic press.  
A. On the merits, it’s bad law.   
¶10 The Court misunderstood spectrum.  Rights to use frequencies can be subdivided 
just as other rights and are no more “physically scarce” than paper, water, or diamonds.  
There is literally no limit to the number of “broadcast frequencies” given time sharing or 
frequency-splitting possibilities, e.g., or the creation of joint ownership interests in a 
 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 2415162, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-582_NeutralAmCu9OrgsPriceCrawford.pdf.  
The Amici Brief argued:  
I. Despite the FCC’s Arguments Below, both Red Lion and Scarcity are Irrelevant to this 
Case; II. Revisiting Pacifica Would Affect A Limited Domain, Where Strict Scrutiny May 
Already Apply; III. Revisiting Red Lion Would Unpredictably Affect Numerous 
Foundational Laws Supporting Media Diversity and Democratic Content in Numerous 
Media; A. Red Lion Supports Structural Regulation for Universal Access to Diverse 
Information Sources; B. Red Lion Supports Political and Educational Content Ensuring an 
Informed Citizenry; C. Red Lion Supports Flexible and Dynamic Spectrum Policy to Further 
Citizen and Consumer Rights; D. Red Lion Does Not Support Content-Based or Viewpoint-
Based Suppression of Disfavored Speech; IV. Under Any Scenario, Nothing Good Comes 
From Revisiting Red Lion, an Irrelevant Case Here; A. Under Scenario #1: Reconsidering 
Red Lion Results In Chaos By Rendering Unconstitutional Every Single FCC Spectrum 
License; B. Under Scenario #2, Reconsidering Red Lion Results in Chaos By Granting 
Incumbent Licensees Heightened Scrutiny and Constitutional Claims Regarding Any 
Advances in Spectrum Licensing. 
Id. at i.   
12 Brief of Center for Democracy & Technology and Adam Thierer, Senior Fellow with the Progress & 
Freedom Foundation (PFF) and the Director of PFF’s Center for Digital Media Freedom as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 
WL 3895912, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-
582_RespondentAmCuCtrforDem&TechThiererrevised.pdf. 
13 Brief of Former FCC Commissioners and Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3539496 (signed by Mark 
Fowler, Jerald Fritz, Henry Geller, Newton N. Minow, James H. Quello, Glen O. Robinson, and Kenneth 
G. Robinson, Jr.), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-
582_RespondentAmCuFmrFCCCommissioners&Officials.pdf.  See also John Eggerton, Former FCC 
Commissioners Weigh in on Profanity Issue, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/354523-
Former_FCC_Commissioners_Weigh_In_On_Profanity_Issue.php. 
14 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Liberties Union, American Booksellers 
Foundation for Free Expression, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Directors Guild of 
America, First Amendment Project, Minnesota Public Radio/American Public Media, National Alliance for 
Media Arts and Culture, National Coalition Against Censorship, National Federation of Community 
Broadcasters, Pen American Center, and Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 
WL 3539494, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-
582_RespondentAmCu12MediaArtsAdvocacyOrgs.pdf. 
15 See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1821 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting reversal of Red 
Lion and Pacifica).   
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license.16   Rights to use frequencies, which the Court thought could be assigned only by 
“public interest” judgments, are now routinely assigned via competitive bidding.17  That 
the market distributes wireless rights makes the economic organization look like other 
markets, including the newspaper business.  And while the Court held that licensing a 
medium of expression could lead to an unconstitutional “chilling effect” on speech, a 
footnote indicated that it had found no evidence that broadcast licensing was having any 
such impact.18  In stunning revelations a few years later, however, the very matter 
decided in Red Lion was shown to have originated as a strategic campaign to file FCC 
Fairness Doctrine challenges so as to “harass and intimidate” speakers of a particular 
viewpoint.19  Red Lion unknowingly facilitated that strategic effort to quash free 
expression. 
¶11 More broadly, statistical evidence gleaned from radio markets after the Fairness 
Doctrine was itself eliminated in 198720 demonstrates that a broad “chilling effect” was 
likely to have existed.21  Perhaps the clearest case against Red Lion, however, is that the 
Supreme Court would not follow its logic in subsequent decisions.  In extending “strict 
scrutiny” to regulation of cable TV or Internet speech, as in such cases as Playboy or 
Reno, the court makes no distinction of First Amendment rights afforded via fixed or 
mobile networks.22  Were the “physical scarcity” of airwaves to require a distinct 
approach to free speech protections, the rulings in these cases would have differentiated 
cable TV from satellite TV, or the wired from the wireless Internet.  To do so would have 
been absurd, however, and the Supreme Court did not go there.23  The Court refused to 
believe in its own Red Lion theory. 
 
16 See Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 3. 
17 The Federal government allocated rights to use radio frequencies without an auction mechanism for 
much of the twentieth century.  Only in 1994, did the Federal Communications Commission start to offer 
licenses to companies or individuals who applied and made an upfront payment as a qualified bidder.  See 
About Auctions, FCC (Aug. 9, 2006), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about_auctions.  
Congress gave the Federal Communications Commission authority to conduct auctions under the 1993 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, with extension and expansion of authority under the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act.  Id. 
18 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392–93 & n.19 (1969). 
19 Id. at 369–70 (describing the Fairness Doctrine at issue); FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE 
BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 34–49 (1976) (chronicling Fairness Doctrine enforcement by the 
FCC upon broadcast television organizations). 
20 The reversal of the Fairness Doctrine was reported widely in the popular press.  Now online, archived 
video of an ABC’s News Washington report by John Martin and Peter Jennings describes the FCC’s vote to 
overturn the Fairness Doctrine.  The fascinating 1:56 video clip includes video of Rev. Billy Hargis, whose 
speech was the subject of the Red Lion case, liberal author Fred Cook, as well as images of the unanimous 
FCC panel that voted to overturn the order and Ralph Nader in favor of retaining the Fairness Doctrine in 
opposition to alleged monopoly control of broadcasting outlets.  See ABC News: Fairness Doctrine 
Abolished (ABC television broadcast Aug. 4, 1987), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/video/aug-
1987-fairness-doctrine-abolished-10541909 (The report is based on a finding that the Fairness Doctrine 
actually chills speech, where FCC staff said 60 broadcasters shied away from reporting). 
21 Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from 
the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 279–301 (1997). 
22 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (“Playboy”); Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“Reno”). 
23 Professor Tribe explains:  
Red Lion against FCC, which, for the past 38 years has perpetrated a profound fallacy about 
spectrum scarcity and the pervasiveness and invasiveness of the broadcast medium.  The 
original idea in Red Lion was that because the broadcast spectrum, in a sense belongs to the 
 55
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
B. Abandoning Red Lion would not be disruptive in the marketplace. 
¶12 Some legal precedents, even if incorrectly established, are risky to overturn in that 
important social activities have been undertaken on their basis.24  To correct the error of 
Red Lion would impact a range of investments, yet the change would be productive rather 
than disruptive.  That is because the system of broadcast regulation authorized under Red 
Lion has been notably ineffective in generating desired results and notably deleterious in 
producing rent seeking efforts that have encouraged inefficient, perverse, speech-limiting 
outcomes.  Expert analysts see the “public interest” requirements imposed on licensed 
broadcasters as little enforced and markedly unsuccessful.  This is the consensus of 
advocates of such regulation,25 which includes former regulators,26 economists,27 and 
legal scholars.28  Were Red Lion to bar such regulation, little would be lost beyond the 
 
government and because the spectrum is scarce and the government must regulate it in order 
to make it possible for people to use it, it therefore follows somehow that the government 
must be able in a sense to censor it, to regulate its content, in that case by adopting so-called 
Fairness Doctrine.  Of course, quite apart from the proposition that there are alternative 
platforms and that by no means is the scarcity rationale plausible, quite apart from that, it 
never followed logically from the fact that the government must play some role in structuring 
and facilitating the use of a particular medium, it never followed from that, that the role it 
could play was one that violated the core First Amendment principle, that it is not up to the 
government to decide what someone ought to say or refuse to say, over his own speech.  And 
it seems to me that if today the Court were to revisit the Red Lion issue, if the FCC were 
again to adopt something like the Fairness Doctrine, the odds are overwhelming that the 
current court would recognize the illogic of Red Lion, especially in an environment where 
you can’t make the argument about scarcity, where there are a multitude of alternative 
platforms, alternative forums, alternative ways of accessing the same material . . . . There was 
another wrong turn that the Supreme Court took in this field, and that was in its, I think, quite 
unfortunate but self-limiting decision in 1978 in the famous seven dirty words case, FCC 
versus Pacifica, saying the FCC could, in effect, punish fleeting expletives, and fleeting 
mentions of the s-word or the f-word.  Today’s FCC continues to sing the Pacifica tune, with 
respect to so-called fleeting indecency, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
on June 4th of this year I think quite clearly got it right when it told the FCC to reconsider its 
abandonment of its earlier and somewhat more enlightened position on this point.  In fact, the 
good news is that the trend in the courts generally and in the Supreme Court has been toward 
the vindication of basic First Amendment principles, while government, at all levels, has 
succumbed to the quite easy temptation to play the role of parent regardless of the 
communication medium involved. 
Tribe, Plenary Address, supra note 4, at 14:45–18:04. 
24 This, of course, is the argument for stare decisis.   
25 NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 155 (1995). 
26 Henry Geller, Promoting the Public Interest in the Digital Era, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 515 (2003); Glen 
O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899 (1998); 
ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION (1996). 
27 R. H. Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and 
Economic Issues, 41 LAND ECON. 161, 161–67 (1965); HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE 111–
12 (1970); ROGER G. NOLL, MERTON J. PECK & JOHN J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION 
REGULATION (1973); BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–12 (1975); BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 
(1992).   
28 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); 
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 203; LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–22 at 699 (1978).  “The clear failure of the ‘technological 
scarcity’ argument as applied to cable television amounts to an invitation to reconsider the tension between 
the Supreme Court’s radically divergent approaches to the print and electronic media.”  Id.  “Indeed, since 
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rent seeking that tends to restrict free speech and is socially costly in wasting economic 
resources.29  Applying strict scrutiny to broadcast licensing extends the First Amendment, 
producing net social gains.30 
C. Correcting Red Lion reduces censorship risk for emerging new media. 
¶13 Congress has repeatedly attempted to impose content controls on new media.  Yet 
the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny as the standard of review, has generally 
voided such rules as unconstitutional violations of free speech.31  In one important 
instance, however, the Court stepped back from strict scrutiny and created an entirely 
new standard of review: intermediate scrutiny.  In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,32 a 5-4 
opinion that failed to overturn “must carry” rules from the 1992 Cable Act, the Court 
ruled that forcing cable TV systems to retransmit local TV stations without compensation 
was not a violation of the First Amendment rights of cable operators.  The outcome 
underscores how a bifurcated First Amendment opens the door for further compromise of 
free speech protections.  Cable TV was not identified as being subject to “physical 
scarcity,” but it appeared to warrant a level of protection between broadcasting and print.  
But cable TV systems, which send edited communications to audiences via “spectrum in 
a tube,” are themselves a platform for access to emerging media, including the Internet.   
¶14 That the Court has not extended its “intermediate scrutiny” standard to other data 
networks is a product not of principled analysis but of a dangerously ad hoc approach.  
As the composition of the Court or the cases it sees evolve, the domain of 
constitutionally-protected speech could be seriously reduced.  In an age when newspapers 
are delivered by cable or telephone wires, and wirelessly to mobile handsets, e-readers, or 
 
the scarcity argument made little sense as a basis distinguishing newspapers from television even in the late 
1960’s and early 1970’s, such reconsideration seems long overdue.”  Id.  See generally ROBERT CORN-
REVERE, RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS (1997). 
29 Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 
DUKE L.J. 1, 82–83 (2002). 
30 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–22 at 697 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
“[E]ntrusting government with power to assure media access entails at least three dangers.”  Id.  Those 
dangers include: “[T]he danger of deterring those items of coverage that will trigger duties of affording 
access at the media’s expense; the danger of inviting manipulation of the media by whichever bureaucrats 
are entrusted to assure access; and the danger of escalating from access regulation to much more dubious 
exercises of government control.”  Id.  See also id. at 581 (“[A]ny governmental action aimed at 
communicative impact is presumptively at odds with the [F]irst [A]mendment”). 
31 U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  In Reno, the Supreme Court explained: 
Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the 
broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a “scarce” expressive commodity.  
It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.  The 
Government estimates that “[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and that 
figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999.”  This dynamic, multifaceted category of 
communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, 
and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.  Through the use of chat rooms, 
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than 
it could from any soapbox.  Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, 
the same individual can become a pamphleteer.  As the District Court found, “the content on 
the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”  
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.  
32 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (“Turner II”) (resulting in a 5-4 decision). 
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notebook computers, the predicate for content controls—a “fairness doctrine” or “must 
carry” regime—is already visible.  Rationalizing the law by revisiting Red Lion avoids 
our current reliance on the luck of the draw.33 
D. Regulation of the press must be achieved through constitutional means. 
¶15 Those who defend the legacy of Red Lion express an interest in protecting 
broadcast ownership limits, must-carry rules, content controls, spectrum allocation 
policies, and other regulations administered in tandem with the “public interest” licensing 
of broadcast stations.   The obvious objection is that, if Red Lion has been incorrectly 
decided, the regulations promulgated under its aegis are themselves worthy of 
reconsideration.  Analysis of the actual policies in question reveals that such an exercise 
is not only important on constitutional grounds but also on public interest grounds.  
Without exception, the proffered policies have failed to achieve the objectives set forth, 
and the non-transparency of FCC licensing decisions aids this failure.  More open and 
reliable avenues for constitutional regulation exist, including antitrust law, where legal 
standards for competition analysis would presumably upgrade the manner in which rules 
were crafted, implemented, and evaluated.   
¶16 This is most pointedly true in the crucial area of spectrum allocation, wherein 
government regulators make frequency inputs—the lifeblood of the wireless economy—
available for use.  The regulatory bottleneck in place34 owes much to Red Lion, which 
gives regulators wide latitude to restrict entry into markets, to impose obligations on 
licensees, and to assign valuable rights according to political criteria.  These regulatory 
powers have been exercised to create and distribute rents to favored constituencies, 
resulting in artificial spectrum scarcity—itself a truncation of free speech35—as well as a 
policy undercutting the emergence of new mobile communications networks.36   
¶17 This Article reviews Red Lion from several angles.  Part II describes the digital 
media store of on-demand video, print, and audio that is at the center of regulatory and 
institutional dissonance.  Part III articulates the thought leadership that expresses First 
Amendment values from an opposing view, a view that seeks to salvage Red Lion as 
precedent for digital media regulation.  While digital media regulation is nascent, 
government intervention may take new forms in a digital world, with a focus on the 
identity and relationship of the speaker to other citizens, by way of disclosure, diversity, 
 
33 The sentiment to revisit Red Lion for its implications on digital media is not a new talking point.  In 
1998, Michael K. Powell, then a Commissioner of the FCC, stated: “Digital convergence, rather than 
reinforcing the unique nature of broadcasting, has blurred the lines between all communications medium 
[sic] . . . .  Even this brief overview of the marketplace makes the reasoning of Red Lion seem almost 
quaint . . . .”  Michael Powell, Remarks before the Media Institute: Willful Denial and First Amendment 
Jurisprudence (Apr. 22, 1998) (cited by Randolph J. May, Charting a New Constitutional Jurisprudence for 
the Digital Age, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 186 n.61 (Randolph J. May ed., 2009)). 
34 Thomas W. Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2008).   
35 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5; Benjamin, Logic of Scarcity, supra note 29.   
36 Thomas W. Hazlett, Property Rights and Wireless License Values, 51 J.L. & ECON. 563 (2008) 
(emphasizing the role of policy in spectrum property rights on the value of wireless communications 
networks).  See also FCC, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN: CONNECTING AMERICA (2010), available at 
http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan/; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, § 6001(k)(2)(D), 123 Stat. 115, 516 (2009) (“Recovery Act”), available at 
http://fdsys.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ5/pdf/PLAW-111publ5.pdf (describing the national policy 
for connecting America with broadband). 
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neutrality, and editorial prerogative.  Part IV delves deeper into the saga of Red Lion, 
reminding readers of the factual realities—including the chill of the Fairness Doctrine—
and the policy at issue in the 1969 case.  Part V presents the doctrinal limitations of Red 
Lion, where First Amendment law and federal content regulation interacts with much 
difficulty and disagreement among scholars, judges, and industry leaders.  Part VI 
addresses the concerns swirling around disrupted media and newsgathering business 
models, with particular scrutiny toward regulatory patches to compensate for the pace of 
media innovation. 
II. MASS MEDIA TO DIGITAL MEDIA 
¶18 In the digital media marketplace, media is sold on-demand, packaged in discrete 
units of entertainment and news, and sold by commercial enterprises for a fee or cross-
subsidized with advertising revenues.37  These units of speech are stored on computer 
databases and transmitted to the reader in the form of audio, text message, video, digital 
book, digital magazine, or blog.38  Media delivery occurs on an on-demand basis and a 
real-time basis depending upon broadband frequency or cable TV wire.39  Information 
 
37 See generally KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 232 (2009) 
(“Twenty million unique visitors came each month in early 2008 to the . . . New York Times . . . . [B]ecause 
the online audience pays less attention to ads and spends less time with an online newspaper, advertisers 
only pay 5 to 10 percent of what they do for the same ad in a newspaper.”).  Ken Auletta explained:  
Not everyone in the newspaper business was on a starvation diet.  Three wire services—the 
AP, Reuters, and Bloomberg—defied the industry trend . . . .  The bleak economic climate for 
newspapers, ironically, benefited the wire services . . . .  And unlike most newspapers, the 
wire services moved early to tap new sources of revenue . . . .  Bloomberg and Reuters, for 
their part, were sitting on data-generating gold mines.  Bloomberg, like Reuters long before it 
merged with Thomson, started as a collector and provider of financial data; essentially, it was 
in the service business, not the news business. 
Id. at 233.  Eric Schmidt of Google was quoted as saying, “There is a systematic change going on in 
how people spend their time.”  Id. at 234.  Ken Auletta further explained:   
Technology was the frenemy of all traditional media businesses . . . .  By providing 
consumers with all these choices, new technology inevitably disrupted traditional habits.  The 
audience that had once belonged to broadcast television moved to cable, to video on demand, 
to DVDs, to YouTube and Facebook and Guitar Hero.  TiVo and DVRs allowed viewers to 
become their own programmers.  This was great for viewers but not so great for the television 
business. 
Id. at 238.   
38 Scholars anticipated such offerings decades ago with the rise of cable television, computing power, 
and programming diversity.  See generally UCLA COMMUNICATIONS LAW SYMPOSIUM, THE FORESEEABLE 
FUTURE OF TELEVISION NETWORKS: LEGAL RESOURCE MANUAL (Charles M. Firestone, Penelope Glass, & 
Michael Morris, eds., 1979).  Les Brown of the New York Times explains: 
More channels and cheaper distribution would inevitably mean more networks, and these 
may be expected to cut into the audiences for ABC, CBS, and NBC, as well as the existing 
local television stations . . . .  The marriage of two-way cable television to the computer, 
making it possible to charge viewers for programs they order with the press of a button, is 
likely to result in a wide variety of specialized programs because they would not require mass 
audiences.  One million viewers paying $2.50 for an opera, for example, could be more than 
enough to justify the telecast. 
Les Brown, Cable and Pay TV on Eve of Technological Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1978, at C12, 
available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F5091EFF3C5413728DDDA80B94DF405B888BF1D3. 
39 Citizens United v. FCC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010) (“Citizens United”) (Justice Kennedy writing for a 
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grazers receive social network-filtered news, cellular mobile email service, satellite TV 
service, and broadband triple-play with voice service.  The regime of over-the-air (OTA) 
broadcasting with its public interest requirements of localism, avoidance of indecency, 
and equal time and fairness regulation is in secular decline.  The courts have generally 
declined to extend regulations for broadcast licensees upon newer technologies, notably 
cable TV and the Internet.40   
¶19 Strict scrutiny review of OTA broadcast media, including indecency regulations, 
would bridge the divide between the broadcast and print regimes.41  The case law on this 
matter, from Red Lion, Pacifica, Tornillo, Playboy, and Reno, compose a matrix of 
precedential complexity that traces back to economic concepts underlying the regulatory 
theory. 
A. Four Decades of Convergence in Law and Technology 
¶20 The Supreme Court has been narrowing and distinguishing its holding from Red 
Lion in a string of decisions over the last twenty years.  However, the decision has not yet 
been fully rejected.42  In 1973, the Supreme Court made clear that broadcasters were 
under no obligation to sell advertising time to a particular party,43 and in 1974, that any 
right of access or a right of reply by a critic was not applicable to print media.44  In 1978, 
the Court noted that “it is well settled that the First Amendment has a special meaning in 
the broadcasting context.”45  Yet in 1984, the Court validated the broadcasters’ other First 
Amendment protections, such as the right to editorialize, even if the stations were 
publicly-funded.46  The Supreme Court then held in 1994, 1997, and 2000 that the 
 
5-4 court explains, “Video-on-demand allows digital cable subscribers to select programming from various 
menus, including movies, television shows, sports, news, and music.  The viewer can watch the program at 
any time and can elect to rewind or pause the program.”).  
40 See also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (“The record demonstrates that 
the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.  As a matter of constitutional tradition 
. . . we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the 
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”). 
41 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINT AND 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PARITY 81 (Comm. Print 1983); GEORGE H. 
SHAPIRO, ET AL., “CABLESPEECH”: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION xii, 20, 58, 63 (1983). 
42 See J. Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 81, 82 n.1 (2004) 
(“Even Judge Douglas Ginsburg, who years before as a law professor expressed disbelief in the spectrum 
scarcity rationale, considered himself constrained to write for the D.C. Circuit in 2002 that, with respect to 
a First Amendment challenge to a particular broadcast regulation, ‘this court is not in a position to reject the 
spectrum scarcity rationale even if it no longer makes sense.’”) (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 
280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW 
AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION, AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 58–61 (1979). 
43 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (“DNC”).  
44 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (“Tornillo”). 
45 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 n.17 (1978), (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367 (1969)); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); DNC, 412 U.S. at 94. 
46 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).  See generally Telecomm. 
Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (The advent of cable and satellite 
technologies may soon render the scarcity doctrine obsolete, but it declined to “reconsider [its] long-
standing approach [to political broadcast regulation] without some signal from Congress or the FCC that 
technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation 
may be required.”) (quoting League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376–77 n.11).   
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regimes articulated for broadcast TV from Red Lion and Pacifica could neither 
constitutionally apply to cable TV47 nor to the Internet.48    
¶21 The Fox Television Stations v. FCC decision and remand to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit displays much of the tension in this area of law.49  The 
litigation involves the FCC’s regulation of broadcast TV programming, and the degree to 
which licensees have free speech rights under the First Amendment.50  A similar case, 
FCC v. CBS Corp., is before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which will 
likely craft a narrow analysis based upon the “intent” of the FCC in promulgating an 
order, rather than addressing the constitutional question of content-based indecency 
regulation of broadcast TV.51   
¶22 Under Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (“Turner I”), 
the holding of Red Lion was limited to over-the-air broadcasting, rather than extended to 
cable TV.52  Importantly, Turner I did not deal with broadcasters’ First Amendment 
rights but with cable operators’ First Amendment rights.53  The Supreme Court held that 
the “must-carry” provisions of the 1992 Cable Act were content-neutral structural 
regulation.54  The Court then placed cable TV operators somewhere between the two 
models—print v. broadcast—in the 5-4 decision in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (“Turner II”).55   
¶23 In Turner II, the Supreme Court held that the content-neutral legislation passed 
intermediate review.56  This allowed Congress (and then the FCC) to impose must-carry 
obligations forcing cable TV systems to retransmit, without charge, local broadcast TV 
stations.  The Government argued that the public interest in “localism” was advanced by 
guaranteeing that broadcast stations would be distributed, via cable systems, to 
households.  Left to their own devices, cable operators would tend to exclude broadcast 
stations from their program line-ups, as TV stations compete with cable TV systems for 
local advertising revenues.  In dissent, Justice Sandra O’Connor wrote:  
¶24 But the First Amendment as we understand it today rests on the premise that it is 
government power, rather than private power, that is the main threat to freedom of 
 
47 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994) (“Turner I”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (“Turner II”); U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  
48 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  
49 Fox Television Stations, Inc., v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), remanded from 129 S. Ct. 1800 
(2009) (holding FCC order was not arbitrary or capricious).  Oral Argument, Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 06-1760-ag), available at http://c-
spanvideo.org/program/291305-1.  
50 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726. 
51 FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit for further consideration in light of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800  
(2009)).  See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (providing a definition of “indecent”); 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) 
(2006) (authorizing the FCC to impose forfeitures on those who “willfully or repeatedly failed to comply 
with any of the provisions of this chapter or of any rule, regulation, or order issued by the Commission 
under this chapter,” where “willful,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 312(f), is “the conscious and deliberate 
commission or omission of [any] act, irrespective of any intent to violate”). 
52 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638–39. 
53 Id. (“The broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television does not suffer 
from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium.”).   
54 Id.; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (“Turner II”). 
55 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 180.  For a criticism of Turner II, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing "Must-
Carry" under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2000). 
56 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 180. 
 61
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
expression; as a consequence, the Amendment imposes substantial limitations on the 
Government even when it is trying to serve concededly praiseworthy goals.57 
¶25 Also in 1997, the Supreme Court reviewed legislation addressing speech on the 
Internet.  In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (“Reno”), the 
Court noted how the absence of scarcity with regard to the Internet58 had created a 
“dynamic, multifaceted category of communication [that] includes not only traditional 
print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images . . . .  [O]ur cases provide 
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to 
the Internet.”59  Today, as Internet-based audio and video transmissions transmit over any 
material that is technologically feasible—whether co-axial wires, fiber-optic cables, or 
unlicensed radio frequencies—reconciliation seems impossible; compare Red Lion with 
Tornillo,60 a case dealing with print media, let alone Reno and U.S. v. Playboy 
Entertainment, a major decision dealing with cable TV signal bleed.61   
¶26 Intermediate courts, particularly the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, also acknowledged weaknesses of the broadcast and print distinction.  
Consider “teletext,” a cutting-edge innovation of displaying textual news updates on the 
over-the-air TV unit.  The new application invited litigation, where parties asked if three 
political broadcast laws on video programming would necessarily constrain news content 
delivered through teletext.  In the facts of the case, Telecommunications Research and 
Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“TRAC”),62 the FCC refused to 
apply each of the three laws—47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982), 
and the Fairness Doctrine 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985)—to teletext.63  The FCC held that 
the § 312(a)(7) requirements were inapplicable, since teletext was subsidiary to a 
candidate’s access to broadcasting station video programming.64  The FCC also held that 
the § 315(a) requirements were beyond the scope of teletext, when teletext does not 
trigger the visual appearance requirements of “use” of “personal appearance by a legally 
qualified candidate.”65  But most elaborately, the FCC held the Fairness Doctrine 
inapplicable to teletext “because . . . teletext's unique blending of the print medium with 
radio technology fundamentally distinguishes it from traditional broadcast 
programming.”66  Market penetration of teletext compared to print and broadcasting also 
 
57 Id. at 248 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
58 The Court’s phraseology was that there was an absence of “the conditions that prevailed when 
Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum.”  Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (1997).   
59 Id. 
60 “There may be ways to reconcile Red Lion and Tornillo but the ‘scarcity’ of broadcast frequencies 
does not appear capable of doing so.  Perhaps the Supreme Court will one day revisit this area of the law 
and either eliminate the distinction between print and broadcast media, surely by pronouncing Tornillo 
applicable to both, or announce a constitutional distinction that is more usable than the present one.”  See 
Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“TRAC”). 
61 U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).   
62 TRAC, 801 F.2d at 501. 
63 Id. at 502, 503 (citing FCC, Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983)). 
64 Id. at 504. 
65 Id. (“The Commission also reasoned that teletext differed from ‘traditional broadcast programming’ 
because it does not have the powerful audiovisual capabilities of main-channel broadcasting, and, therefore, 
does not pose the danger of ‘abuse’ of these powerful sound and image ‘uses’ that Congress envisioned in 
enacting section 315.”). 
66 Id. (citing Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1324) (emphasis added).  See also id. at 505 
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justified the FCC’s decision, where “teletext, as a print medium . . . would not encounter 
the same degree of scarcity, in the usual sense, as the sound and visual images of regular 
programming.”67  
¶27 On review, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC’s dance between 
broadcasting and teletext.  Judge Robert Bork held that such a maneuver could not be 
accomplished.68  The D.C. Circuit criticized both grounds offered by the FCC.  The FCC 
supported its treatment of teletext where: (1) the FCC derived an “immediacy” 
component, out of whole cloth without doctrinal or factual support, stating that the 
component was implicit in the scarcity of distribution channels for sound and visual 
images, compared to that of merely visual text, and (2) the FCC emphasized teletext’s 
resemblance to print, where scarcity regulation does not apply.69  First, Judge Bork 
rejected the combination of sound plus visual images as deserving less First Amendment 
protection.70  That sound and visual images would produce a greater communicative 
impact did not lend itself to greater regulation; Judge Bork held skepticism that the “very 
effectiveness of speech” argument had legitimacy under First Amendment law.71  He also 
declined to see any Supreme Court endorsement of the FCC’s addition of an 
“immediacy” rationale underlying the scarcity doctrine.72  Second, Judge Bork 
questioned the selective ignorance of the scarcity doctrine when teletext traveled over 
broadcast frequencies.  Teletext’s resemblance to print media raised an important point in 
the analysis: “The basic difficulty in this entire area is that the line drawn between the 
print media and the broadcast media, resting as it does on the physical scarcity of the 
latter, is a distinction without a difference.”73  Constitutional principles were at stake: 
“Employing the scarcity concept as an analytic tool, particularly with respect to new and 
unforeseen technologies, inevitably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results.”74 
 
(citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C. 2d 827, 833 (1985) (“Users of this medium will not 
be listening or viewing teletext in any traditional broadcasting sense, but instead will be reading it, and thus 
be able to skip, scan and select the desired material in ways that are incomparable to anything in the history 
of broadcasting and broadcast regulation.”) (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis in original)). 
67 Id. at 504. 
68 Id. at 509 (“The Commission, therefore, cannot on first amendment grounds refuse to apply to teletext 
such regulation as is constitutionally permissible when applied to other, more traditional, broadcast 
media.”).  
69 Id. at 507–08. 
70 Id. at 508. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id.  Citing to Ronald H. Coase’s 1959 article, Judge Bork also writes:  
All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, computers, and 
other resources that go into the production and dissemination of print journalism.  Not 
everyone who wishes to publish a newspaper, or even a pamphlet, may do so.  Since scarcity 
is a universal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not another.  The 
attempt to use a universal fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily leads to analytical 
confusion. 
 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Digital Broadcast, Digital Print, and Digital Pervasiveness 
¶28 Between 1969 and 2010, the law has ricocheted from one interpretation of the First 
Amendment to another based on the look and feel of the content delivery mechanism.  
Impressionistic responses to various media drive the legal regime.  Change is continually 
forced due to the convergence of rival platforms through device innovation.  For 
example, take the Apple iPad, released in April 2010.75  The device squarely combines 
“overlapping, archaically defined worlds where the FCC’s regulatory edict still 
prevails.”76  The iPad does so by inviting a flood of demand for mobile data and 
“presag[ing] the utter obliteration of the distinction between print and electronic 
media.”77   
¶29 Indeed, the broadcast and print platforms are rival no more.78  The New York Times 
is commonly viewed via a wireless connection—either a Wi-Fi link to a cable modem or 
DSL Internet connection—or a wide-area broadband transmission offered by a cell phone 
operator.  The former sends The New York Times via unlicensed frequencies; the latter 
sends via licensed frequencies.  Both means utilize the “physically scarce” airwaves that 
the Red Lion opinion finds to be the premise for diminished First Amendment protection.  
While the “rights of listeners”79 mandated that FCC “fairness doctrine” rules ensure that 
radio stations do not broadcast biased and unbalanced programming, those same airwaves 
now carry The New York Times to millions.  The print media retains First Amendment 
protection despite media convergence, while other forms of media struggle under 
increased incoherence of the law with technological development.  Emerging 
communications networks have thus far been granted a clean slate, avoiding broadcast 
TV obligations; the inconsistency remains that these new networks depend upon 
transmission technologies that were once deserving of strict licensing and content 
restrictions.    
¶30 The Red Lion and Pacifica rulings supply twin pillars for regulating broadcast 
media, including prior restraints in the form of licensing.80  The distinction in free speech 
rights rides on the technical nature of the distribution platform—the manner in which 
electromagnetic signals travel through space versus the delivery of paper.  Curiously, if 
fortuitously, emerging media in the late 20th and early 21st centuries—from AOL to 
 
75 Press Release, Apple, Apple Sells Over 300,000 iPads First Day (Apr. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2010/04/05ipad.html; Edward C. Baig, Verdict is in on Apple iPad: It’s a 
Winner, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2010-03-31-
apple-ipad-review_N.htm. 
76 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., End of the Net Neut Fetish?, WALL ST. J., April 7, 2010, at A13, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303411604575168053474388236.html. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. (“Faster than anybody might have expected, fixed and mobile are becoming competitive 
substitutes for each other.  Ask any iPhone user who goes back and forth between WiFi and AT&T's 3G 
network.”). 
79 “It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
80 See generally Matthew Bloom, Note, Pervasive New Media: Indecency Regulation and the End of the 
Distinction Between Broadcast Technology and Subscription-Based Media, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 109 
(2007); Joshua B. Gordon, Note, Pacifica is Dead, Long Live Pacifica: Formulating a New Argument 
Structure to Preserve Government Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2006) 
(exploring the necessity of a “communitarian obligation” doctrine to justify indecency regulations for the 
protection of children in light of strict scrutiny review and the contours of the scarcity justification). 
 64
Vol. 9:3] Thomas W. Hazlett et al. 
Facebook, MediaFlo to Google Search, and Twitter to DowJones.com—have largely 
escaped the broadcast regulation model.  These websites are not licensed according to 
“public interest;”81 have no obligations for “equal time,” “fairness,” or “localism;”82 and 
need not disclose campaign (or other) contributions supporting programs or candidates.83   
¶31 Internet media is not as pervasive as the FCC considered radio and television 
broadcasts to invade the home; this pervasiveness feature is central to the Internet 
media’s First Amendment rights to be free from content regulation.84  Given the nature of 
Internet media and the technological landscape today, the Supreme Court found “no basis 
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”85  The Court’s holding begs the question: how pervasive are traditional 
transmission conduits of AM/FM radio and OTA broadcast TV, compared to cable TV, 
satellite TV or Internet video?86  Such a pervasiveness analysis relies upon control 
technologies, such as the V-Chip upon TV units, and rates of adoption and penetration of 
each form of transmission technology.  As smart phones incorporate higher capacity to 
stream video, the penetration rates of cell phones used by teenagers necessarily become 
relevant as well.  Facts indicate that the adoption of cellular technology is rising at a 
dramatic rate.87 
 
81 In a report prepared by the FCC, the FCC established: 
[W]henever we review an application—whether to build a new station, modify or renew a 
license or sell a station—we must determine if its grant would serve the public interest.  As 
discussed earlier, we expect station licensees to be aware of the important problems and 
issues facing their local communities and to foster public understanding by presenting 
programming that relates to those local issues.  As discussed in this Manual, however, 
broadcasters—not the FCC or any other government agency—are responsible for selecting 
the material that they air.  By operation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and 
because the Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from censoring 
broadcast matter, our role in overseeing program content is very limited.  We license only 
individual broadcast stations.  We do not license TV or radio networks (such as CBS, NBC, 
ABC or Fox) or other organizations with which stations have relationships (such as PBS or 
NPR), except to the extent that those entities may also be station licensees.  We also do not 
regulate information provided over the Internet, nor do we intervene in private disputes 
involving broadcast stations or their licensees.  Instead, we usually defer to the parties, courts, 
or other agencies to resolve such disputes. 
MEDIA BUREAU, FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM YOUR 
LOCAL STATION 8 (2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public_and_broadcasting.pdf. 
82 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2006) (requiring localism); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (“If any licensee shall permit any 
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall 
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates . . . in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, 
That such licensee shall have no power of censorship . . . .”).  See also Daniel L. Brenner, Creating 
Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 13, 55 (2010) (describing the political 
economy of the FCC and the administration of Section 315); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the 
Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003). 
83 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 237, 240–41 (2003). 
84 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  See generally Jonathan D. Wallace, 
The Specter of Pervasiveness: Pacifica, New Media, and Freedom of Speech (Cato Institute, Briefing Paper 
No. 35, Feb. 12, 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-035.html. 
85 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.  See also Robert Corn-Revere, The First Amendment and the Electronic 
Media, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/internet/overview.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
86 U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
87 The Pew Internet & American Life Project recently reported that daily text messaging by teens has 
increased from 38% to 54% between February 2008 and September 2009.  Of these teens, half send 50 or 
more text messages per day, and one out of three send more than 100 per day.  Amanda Lenhart, Rich Ling, 
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¶32 The proper approach for reviewing laws that regulate fleeting expletives, violence, 
animal cruelty, political speech, and hate speech would be that of strict scrutiny: 
articulation of a compelling, narrowly tailored government interest (not merely a 
substantial interest)88 for content regulation of digital media.89  One-way mass media 
delivery and two-way digital speech can be harmful in degrees with bullying, shaming, 
anonymous threats, and opinionated political discourse, which will result in greater 
information age litigation.90  Internationally, governments now spend more resources to 
manage the politics of data collection, as states make data requests for criminal 
investigations,91 while installing sophisticated filtering technologies.92  The question of 
freedom of information and government intervention has become more acute with time. 
 
Scott Campbell & Kristen Purcell, Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Teens-and-Mobile-Phones.aspx.  See generally 
John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010).  See also 
FCC, IN THE MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6002(B) OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993: FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 107, Chart 25, WT Docket No. 09-66, FCC 
10–81 (FCC May 20, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
81A1.pdf; Dan Frommer, 25 Awesome Charts On The State of The Wireless Industry, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(May 21, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/25-charts-on-the-state-of-the-wireless-
industry-2010-5 (presenting slideshow of charts from the FCC Fourteenth Annual Report on Mobile 
Wireless Competition). 
88 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).   
89 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (“Stevens”).  In Stevens, where defendant sold 
“crush videos” depicting animal cruelty, the animal cruelty criminal statute was held constitutionally 
overbroad by an 8-1 decision.  Defendant was sentenced to five years of prison.  The underlying conduct is 
banned in most states already.  “The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people 
that the benefit of its restrictions on the Government outweighs the costs.” Id. at 1585.  See also Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (concerning political speech);  FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (concerning indecency regulation). 
90 See generally Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890–91.  “We must decline to draw, and then redraw, 
constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from a 
particular speaker.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “It must be noted, moreover, that this undertaking would 
require substantial litigation over an extended time, all to interpret a law that beyond doubt discloses 
serious First Amendment flaws.”  Id.  “The interpretive process itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, 
and serious risk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, would 
themselves be questionable.”  Id. (citations omitted).  See also Bradley A. Smith, Newsflash: First 
Amendment Upheld, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704509704575019112172931620.html.  “But the First 
Amendment is all about distrusting government to make those decisions about who has spoken too much.  
That's why Thursday's decision is such a breath of fresh air.”  Id.  “The next time you download a book on 
Kindle, buy a Michael Moore screed at Barnes & Noble, or order up a political movie from video on 
demand, remember that it is the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United that guarantees you the right 
to do so.”  Id. 
91 Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google Discloses Government Demands for User Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704448304575196270380066334.html (“The 
company’s new disclosure tool shows that Brazil made the most requests for user data during the last six 
months of 2009, with 3,663.  The U.S. was second with 3,580.  Brazil also led with 291 requests for 
removal of content, with Germany in second place and the U.S fourth, behind India.”). 
92 See, e.g., Sumner Lemon, Google Says Its Services Are Widely Blocked, Censored, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9175827 (“Google products . . . have been 
blocked in 25 of the 100 countries where we offer our services.”); Kevin J. O’Brien, Saudis Relent a Bit on 
Shutting Down Blackberry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at B2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/technology/11rim.html  (“Governments in Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates and India have recently expressed concern about R.I.M.’s reluctance to provide them with 
access to its encrypted e-mail traffic—an information flow that R.I.M. itself claims to have no way of 
decoding.”). 
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¶33 In the private sector, perhaps to pre-empt government regulation, industry has 
advanced mechanisms designed to protect children from dubious programming.93  The 
editorial standards applied to potential iPhone applications offered in the Apple Store 
recently received press attention when a particular Pulitzer Prize winner’s political 
cartoon application was rejected.94  Additionally, Apple’s iPhone has a parental controls 
feature, but the company policy maintains a prohibition on nudity in iPhone 
applications.95  In a question and answer session at an iPhone 4.0 developer preview 
event, Steve Jobs explained the business decision to protect children: “You know, there’s 
a porn store for [Google] Android.  You can download nothing but porn.  You can 
download porn, your kids can download porn.  That’s a place we don’t want to go—so 
we’re not going to go there.”96   
¶34 The digital media model invites comparison between digital bits and speech printed 
on paper addressed in Miami Herald v. Tornillo.97  The broadcast and print models have 
long been noted, compared, and contrasted since Tornillo.98  The Supreme Court, for its 
part, has assiduously avoided such comparisons, but has nonetheless supplied the 
necessary documentation.  In 1974, it unanimously overturned a Florida statute that gave 
a political candidate a right to free “equal time” to answer a hostile newspaper editorial.99  
The Court found that the First Amendment protected the discretion of the newspaper 
owners and editors,100 no matter their economic power in the news market, or political 
influence.101   
 
93 For a tangential, but related discussion of protecting children from violence in video games and other 
media, see Tribe, Plenary Address, supra note 4. 
94 Brian Stelter, Apple Invites Pulitzer Winner to Resubmit His Rejected iPhone App, MEDIA DECODER 
BLOG, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010, 1:19 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/apple-
invites-pulitzer-winner-to-resubmit-his-iphone-app/.   
95 Brian X. Chen, Porn-Free Playboy iPhone App Is Here, But Who Will Buy It?, GADGET LAB, WIRED 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 10, 2009, 6:19 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/12/porn-free-playboy-iphone-
app-is-here-but-who-will-buy-it/. 
96 Jason Kincaid, Steve Jobs on Why the iPhone Doesn’t Allow Unsigned Apps: They Don’t Want A 
Porn Store, TECHCRUNCH BLOG (Apr. 8, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/08/steve-jobs-on-why-the-
iphone-doesnt-allow-unsigned-apps-they-dont-want-a-porn-store/#ixzz0lg6asJwW. 
97 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
98 See, e.g., Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of 
Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976). 
99 Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).  
100 Id. 
101 Id.  See L. A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 383 (1987) (“Because editorial autonomy 
is indivisible, it must be absolute.  It is either there or it is not. . . .  Someone must say what is printed and 
what is not. . . .  In a disputed case someone must prevail, and if it is not the editor, then we are discussing a 
different principle.”); id. at 363 (describing Jerome Barron’s argument for government regulation of the 
press and characterizing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan as a “missed opportunity” and that “the concentration of 
ownership, canned editorials, and syndicated columnists had both diminished the ‘robust’ debate called for 
by Justice Brennan's majority opinion and effectively excluded most members of the public from 
participation in the debate.”) (footnote omitted).  Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641–78 (1967) (presenting a legal argument for government 
regulation of press).  Barron discussed “an active role of the government to remedy the defects of a 
concentrated market.”  Powe, Tornillo, supra note 101, at 364.  “For Barron the issue was the quality of 
debate in the marketplace.  Citizens could not hope to own presses and were excluded from the pages of 
papers.  Yet New York Times took a powerful institution and gave it yet another right.”  Id.  “As Mark 
Tushnet would later (and perhaps excessively) put it, ‘[T]he First Amendment, usually thought of as a 
vehicle by which otherwise powerless people can gain power, became another one of the assets held by the 
powerful.’” (footnote omitted).  Id. 
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¶35 This laissez-faire approach, established for the most powerful media outlet in the 
state of Florida, stood in stark contrast to the broadcast obligation to air counter 
viewpoints, without charge, imposed on a tiny, daytime-only radio station in Red Lion, 
Pennsylvania.  The government action that the Court had upheld as constitutional just 
five years earlier on OTA broadcast radio was rejected when applied to printed 
newspapers.102  The difference between broadcasters103 and newspapers104 is a curiosity, 
as newspapers now generate and broadcast video programming.105  As some interests 
push for greater government regulation and others resist such controls, courts will have to 
deal with doctrinal inconsistencies that have developed in the law.106  Of course, they 
may embrace those conflicts with new rationales, or they may seek to rationalize the law 
by correcting existing errors.   
III. THE RED LION SAGA AND PROPOSALS FOR A REMAKE 
¶36 Red Lion has been a dangling thread on the constitutional quilt even before it was 
suited up for its 1969 opinion.  In its original rendition, offered in the 1943 NBC case,107 
the Court held in a 6-3 decision that broadcast licensees did not enjoy full free speech 
rights under the First Amendment due to the inherent scarcity of radio licenses.  Because 
not all who might like to own and operate a broadcast station could do so, the number of 
licenses had to be limited.  In awarding these rights, the FCC could—so said the Court—
 
102 Powe, Tornillo, supra note 101, at 370 (“No matter how constitutional the Fairness Doctrine seemed 
in Red Lion, the briefs all were certain that such a regime was unthinkable and unconstitutional for 
newspapers.”).  Going in more detail, Powe writes, “[a]lthough Red Lion had specifically rejected finding a 
chilling effect from the Fairness Doctrine, the newspaper position was that the Fairness Doctrine did in fact 
chill and thus would result in less rather than greater debate.” Id. 
103 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A licensed broadcaster is ‘granted the free and 
exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is 
burdened by enforceable public obligations.’”) 
104 Powe, Tornillo, supra note 101, at 391 (“If this movement were not halted in one shot, then the 
traditional barrier would be down and the legislative experimentation might begin. . . . Whether we would 
still think of freedom of the press in terms of the fierce independence from government would also be 
open.”). 
105 See, e.g., Video, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL: THE NEWS HUB, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/page/the-news-hub.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).  Mike Shield of 
MediaWeek explains: 
Digits follows the company’s aggressive push into live content last September when it rolled 
out News Hub, a twice daily news series.  Since then the company has taken to producing 
more four to five live video segments each day tied to breaking news events, as Journal 
audience has embrace video viewing.  According to Alan Murray, deputy managing editor 
and executive editor, online, The Wall Street Journal Network delivered a record 5.5 million 
streams in January, with about a million or so views being generated by News Hub.  “We’re 
really pioneering here,” said Murray.  “We’re doing significantly more than we have before.”  
And while 90 percent or so of News Hubs views occur on demand, we believe that viewers 
are attracted to the show’s live feel “That creates a certain kind of energy, a sense of 
immediacy.” 
Mike Shields, The WSJ Digital Network Turns Up the Volume on Video, MEDIAWEEK (Feb. 24, 2010) 
http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/content_display/news/digital-
downloads/broadband/e3ib108b71d68d61db9b1d85d5cb2ca75f2. 
106 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The text of the First Amendment makes no distinction between print, broadcast, and cable 
media.”). 
107 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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make various demands on editors that would be improper in the context of newspaper 
editors or book publishers.  Radio spectrum was a medium uniquely constrained by 
nature, and as such demanded a different First Amendment interpretation. 
¶37 The view that using spectrum as an input fundamentally lessens First Amendment 
protection of free speech has always been confusing.108  As Justice William O. Douglas, 
who was recused in the 8-0 Red Lion verdict, but later wrote that he would have dissented 
had he not been sidelined for medical reasons, noted: “What kind of First Amendment 
would best serve our needs as we approach the 21st century may be an open question.”109  
He continued, “But the old-fashioned First Amendment that we have is the Court's only 
guideline; and one hard and fast principle which it announces is that Government shall 
keep its hands off the press.”110  Today, circumstances force policy makers to reconsider 
that logic.  While technology obliterates old boundaries, political interests will be 
tempted to force extensions of speech regulation through the sort of ad hoc justifications 
embedded in Red Lion.  We begin our inquiry underlying these deficiencies.  
A. The Story of Red Lion and Its Ineffectiveness 
¶38 With the birth of radio broadcasting in 1920, the first important, policy-forcing 
conflicts between radio spectrum users developed.  The initial response of the legal 
system was to adopt a “priority-in-use” system enforced by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce under the 1912 Radio Act.111  This statute gave the federal government the 
authority to issue licenses to all radio stations so as to “control interference.”112  The 
system worked to protect investments in stations, and over 500 such broadcasters entered 
the market.113  Millions of radio sets were purchased by households, popular programs 
were aired, and the industry quickly developed.114   
¶39 Calls for greater political control over the distribution of licenses were heard.  
These came both from policy makers, such as Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, 
and from the major commercial broadcast stations.115  The latter formed a trade 
association in 1925, the National Association of Broadcasters, which called for “public 
 
108 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (“[T]he moving picture screen, the radio, the 
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses 
and dangers.  Each . . . is a law unto itself.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) 
(“[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards 
applied to them.”). 
109 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 160–61 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted).   
110 Id.  Justice Douglas continued, “That principle has served us through days of calm and eras of strife 
and I would abide by it until a new First Amendment is adopted.”  Id.  “That means, as I view it, that TV 
and radio, as well as the more conventional methods for disseminating news, are all included in the concept 
of press as used in the First Amendment and therefore are entitled to live under the laissez-faire regime 
which the First Amendment sanctions.”  Id. 
111 Thomas Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 
(1990), reprinted in STUART M. BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS G. LICHTMAN & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY (2001).   
112 Id. at 142 (citing Jora R. Minasian, The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920s, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 391, 391–403 (1969)). 
113 Id. at 140, tbl.2 (citing HIRAM L. JOME, ECONOMICS OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY 70 (1925)). 
114 Id. at 139. 
115 Id. at 152. 
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interest” licensing.116  This would presumably grandfather the larger stations with 
substantial audiences, while blocking the emergence of upstart rivals.117  Policy makers, 
including Secretary Hoover and key members of Congress, embraced licensing as a 
mechanism for asserting some level of control over an emerging, influential medium of 
public opinion.118   
¶40 When the Department of Commerce dropped its enforcement of the “priority-in-
use” system of rights, ostensibly in response to a federal court verdict in July 1926, what 
ensued was then called “the period of the breakdown of the law.”119  New stations began 
emitting without legal authorization, and many existing stations changed frequency 
assignments.120  Interference between broadcasts diminished the quality of reception for 
many listeners.  Thus, the “breakdown” increased the demand for regulation.  The 
resulting law, the Federal Radio Act, was passed by Congress and then signed by 
President Calvin Coolidge on February 23, 1927.121   
¶41 In the following decades, academics debated whether spectrum rights should be 
exchanged by the pricing mechanism rather than a central administrator.122  The argument 
was rendered moot in 1994, when the U.S. government conducted the first U.S. wireless 
license auction.123  The nature of the rights to use valuable, invisible airwaves had proven 
confusing to policy-makers.124  Through the rise of radio, broadcast TV, cable TV, and 
 
116 Id. at 152–53. 
117 Id. at 154, 157. 
118 Id. at 159. 
119 Id. at 148 (citing Comment, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 245, 247 (1929)). 
120 Id. 
121 44 Stat. § 1162 (1927), 47 U.S.C. §§ 81–119 (1928). 
122 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 15 nn.31–32 (citing Leo Herzel, 
"Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802, 809 (1951) 
(suggesting channels should be leased to the highest bidder)); Leo Herzel, Rejoinder, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 
106 (1952) (“Such [diverse] users, [police, commercial telegraph, and oil industry device users] compete 
for all other kinds of equipment or else they don't get it.  I should think the more interesting question is, 
why is it seriously suggested that they shouldn't compete for radio frequencies?”); Dallas W. Smythe, 
Facing Facts about the Broadcast Business, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1952) (arguing that government users 
of spectrum dominated commercial broadcasting, described as a minor claimant on spectrum rights).   
123 About Auctions, FCC (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about_auctions.  “In 1993 Congress passed the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act, which gave the Commission authority to use competitive bidding to choose 
from among two or more mutually exclusive applications for an initial license.”  Id.  “Prior to this historic 
legislation, the Commission mainly relied upon comparative hearings and lotteries to select a single 
licensee from a pool of mutually exclusive applicants for a license.  The Commission has found that 
spectrum auctions more effectively assign licenses than either comparative hearings or lotteries.”  Id.  “[B]y 
using auctions, the Commission has reduced the average time from initial application to license grant to 
less than one year, and the public is now receiving the direct financial benefit from the award of licenses.”  
Id.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). 
124 Professor Coase explains:  
It is not easy to understand the feeling of hostility to the idea that people should pay for the 
facilities they use. It is true that this attitude has been supported by the argument that it was 
technologically impossible to charge for the use of frequencies, but this is clearly wrong. It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the widespread opposition to the use of the pricing 
system for the allocation of frequencies can be explained only by the fact that the possibility 
of using it has never been seriously faced. 
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 24. 
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Internet, courts and Congress have carved out regulations that have challenged the limits 
on government intervention in media content.125 
¶42 Red Lion claims to protect the public interest by placing the rights of the listener as 
paramount.126  This then allows the state to compromise the broadcaster’s rights to speak 
as an organ of the press on the grounds that regulators must manage spectrum—an 
economic resource which would be dissipated were limits not applied to its use.127  In 
essence, to avert tragedy of the commons in airwaves, the government is permitted to 
license firms and structure markets.128  Because an “open access” regime would destroy 
the value of frequencies, the government acquires the right to bypass the First 
Amendment and impose content regulations on broadcasters. 
¶43 The argument is a non sequitur.  As revealed in Ronald Coase’s 1959 article, The 
Federal Communications Commission,129 essentially all economic resources rely on rules 
limiting access, which enable assets to be used for their highest valued employment.  
Airwaves can be depleted of productive utility when lack of such rules permits a “tragedy 
of the commons,” but so can other goods lacking legal ownership rights—including ink 
and newsprint.  Yet, the legal limits defining the rules for the use of such inputs into 
newspapers have created no “scarcity doctrine” allowing the state to evade the 
protections of the First Amendment on the grounds that they are advancing the interests 
of readers or advertisers rather than the publishers.130   
¶44 The scarcity doctrine first appeared in Supreme Court case law in NBC v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).  Justice Felix Frankfurter described the resource 
management chaos facts: “Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development 
as traffic control was to the development of the automobile . . . Congress acted upon the 
 
125 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”).  See 47 
U.S.C. § 309(a), (k)(1)(A) (2006) (concerning licenses renewed upon a finding that the “the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity” have been served); 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (providing that "the Commission from 
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . [m]ake such rules and 
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions of [the Act]."). 
126 See C. Edwin Baker, Keynote Address: Three Cheers for Red Lion, Symposium: Does Red Lion Still 
Roar? Public Interest Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 861, 861 (2009) (“Red Lion merits praise, first, for announcing the correct central constitutional 
principle for media policy; second, for being fundamentally a media and not merely a broadcast case; and, 
third, for properly understanding and explaining the economic basis of regulation.”).  Baker emphasized, 
“The Court said, ‘It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount.’”  Id.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).   
127 Baker, Red Lion, supra note 126, at 866–68 (“Red Lion shows not only that intervention is proper, 
even inevitable in many circumstances if resources are to be usable, but Red Lion also gives the values—
serving the audiences' democratic informational and discourse needs—that should guide these interventions 
in the media realm.”); Mark Lloyd, Red Lion Confusions, Symposium: Does Red Lion Still Roar? Public 
Interest Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 
872–75 (2009) (“Coase's abstract point, that scarcity does not of itself call for government regulation, is 
both irrefutable and irrelevant.”). 
128 See C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 
SUP. CT. REV. 57, 104 (1994).  “Rather than relying on an assertedly unique but ultimately incoherent 
notion of scarcity, the Court in Red Lion is better understood to have developed a more tenable general 
principle.”  Id.  “Relying most heavily on a case coming from the print realm (Associated Press), the Court 
essentially held that the government has the power to structure the media in a manner that the government 
thinks will promote the best communications environment.”  Id. 
129 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2. 
130 NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (“NBC”). 
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knowledge that if the potentialities of radio were not to be wasted, regulation was 
essential.”131  He then developed a theory of communications policy: “Unlike other 
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all.  That is its unique 
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to 
governmental regulation.  Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must 
be denied.”132  Twenty-six years later, the Red Lion court echoed this sentiment about the 
limited number of licenses: “[B]ecause the frequencies reserved for public broadcasting 
were limited in number, it was essential for the Government to tell some applicants that 
they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a few.”133  Rather than 
stopping at the resource allocation measure, the Red Lion court took the doctrine a step 
farther: “It is idle to posit an unabridgable First Amendment right to broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”134   
¶45 No, it is not.  Ronald Coase unveiled the scarcity fallacy embedded in NBC and 
Red Lion with two-fold reasoning.  First, he noted that “it is a commonplace of 
economics that all resources used in the economic system—and not simply radio and 
television frequencies—are limited in amount and scarce, in that people would like to use 
more than exists.”135  That land, labor, capital, and other economic resources are scarce is 
not a unique precondition or predicate for government regulation.  It is, rather, a predicate 
for ownership rules.136  Hence, the second prong of the argument: “The real cause of 
trouble was that no property rights were created in these scarce frequencies . . . .  There is 
certainly no need for the kind of regulation which we now find in the American radio and 
television industry.”137 
¶46 Coase’s modern view of spectrum rights was taken as a “big joke” by 
communications policy experts for many years.138  Yet, Coase’s view has prevailed.  His 
analysis has become standard, not simply in explaining radio spectrum allocation, but the 
organization of scarce resources generally.  This was acknowledged formally when he 
received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1991.  Yet, while economic theory may 
have moved on, the analytical errors about economic scarcity in Red Lion live on as the 
law of the land.139   
¶47 Media economics research confirms the parallels between broadcasters and 
newspaper firms, which create two-sided markets of journalistic talent, distribution 
networks, and audiences who demand high-quality news.140  There are no differences 
 
131 Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). 
132 Id. at 226. 
133 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969). 
134 Id. 
135 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 14. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. (emphasis added). 
138 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction 
Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 'Big Joke': An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 340 (2001) (“Ronald Coase learned about the intensity with which regulators and 
their constituents defend the status quo soon after proposing bandwidth markets in 1959.  Called to testify 
to the FCC, Commissioner Philip S. Cross opened the questioning with, ‘[I]s this all a big joke?’”).   
139 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969). 
140 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 5 (describing the “schism” between broadcast and 
print); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 203; HARRY J. 
LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE, supra note 27, at 111–12; OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF 
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between the two regimes that warrant regulatory exceptionalism, except one: “[W]e think 
there are differences.”141  As such, perception leads to the belief that regulation naturally 
separates the two media: “[I]t is well settled that the First Amendment has a special 
meaning in the broadcast context.”142  Tradition perhaps explains the discrepancy in 
government oversight on broadcast and print:  
Newspaper people . . . know who their ancestors are, and they wear their tradition 
proudly, even if they fail to live up to it.  But . . . broadcasters are the ‘lineal 
descendants of operators of music halls and peep shows.’  Not a terribly 
complimentary characterization, but still, a case can be made for it.143 
Today, if the technorati deliver print, audio, and video media to users over broadband, 
upon what doctrine does broadcast regulation stand?144  Might the Internet, as opposed to 
broadcast TV, become the medium in need of regulation?145  The Orwellian sense of an 
 
EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 10–12. 
141 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 5, at 213. 
142 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742 n.17 (1978).  See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 203–04 n.4 (“Perhaps it bears emphasis that the dichotomy 
reflected in present law is not between broadcasting and print.  Rather, it is between broadcasting and every 
other medium of mass communications.  The Court truly thinks (or seriously pretends) that broadcasting is 
unique.”). 
143 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 5, at 213 (footnote omitted). 
144 Professor Angela Campbell explains:   
What do we mean by broadcasting?  Is it something that uses the electromagnetic spectrum?  
If so, why are cell phones, which use the spectrum, not considered broadcasting?  Is 
broadcasting the transmission of content from one to many rather than from point to point as 
with a telephone call?  If so, why is cable television not considered broadcasting?  Is 
broadcasting different because the public generally does not have to pay for it but does have 
to pay for cable? 
Angela J. Campbell, The Legacy of Red Lion, Symposium: Does Red Lion Still Roar? Public Interest 
Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2009).   
145 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 5, at 214–15.  “So too [like the printing press], I think, 
with American Broadcasting.  It radiated fear.  It was ‘pervasive,’ ‘unique,’ an ‘intruder’ in our lives.  It 
was–it is–powerful; indeed, it is almost impossible to read an article on broadcasting that does not make 
that point . . . .”  Id.  Powe further explains:  
The New York Times and the Washington Post are powerful, too, but we don’t regulate them 
because of that.  Beyond the fact that the Constitution forbids their regulation, the reason we 
don’t regulate is that we have grown used to them.  They may be powerful, but we think we 
know the how and the why.  With broadcasting . . . we are not as sure what the medium is 
doing to us, and so we attempt to regulate it to prevent it from doing what we do not know it 
is doing.  We may not know the consequences of introducing television into our homes, but 
there appears to be a regulatory consensus that we don’t want those consequences to get out 
of hand.  We fear broadcasting because we don’t understand it as well as we do print.  The 
fear may be irrational, but it is there nevertheless.  It does not justify regulation, but it does 
explain it. 
Id.  See also Tribe, Plenary Address, supra note 4, at 58:00—59:17: 
[A]ll of those constitutional protections should be construed as fully applicable without 
regard to the fears that modernity thrusts upon us.  It was about seven decades ago that 
Franklin Roosevelt famously said ‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.’  And I think 
a similar point needs to be emphasized today.  We need to focus not on all the scary things 
that could befall us, or our children, or our grandchildren, unless we give up our freedom to 
an all powerful government.  But we need to focus on all the hopeful things that we can 
accomplish, if we put our minds and our energies to the task of empowering individuals and 
families to protect themselves and pursue their own dreams for a better life.  That’s why the 
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“intruder” and “uniquely pervasive” visitor in the home provides a possible justification 
for new media content regulation.146  The American who now grazes on multiple 
information sources per day has adapted to a technological environment where 
information is delivered with algorithmic customization.147  News, information, and 
entertainment rarely wait on doorsteps in the form of rolled newspapers.  Modern 
consumers receive data at all hours of the day, in the office, car, and home.  
¶48 Consider Pacifica, where the ability of a radio broadcast to waft into the home and 
be easily heard by a child, drove the Court to permit government regulation of George 
Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” monologue.  This was thought consistent with the First 
Amendment, given that Red Lion had already opened the door for disparate treatment of 
the electronic press, in that there was an “intrusion” by the wireless communication.  It 
was there and potentially available to create problems for parents of young listeners, even 
if uninvited.  Again, the premise for law was the nature of the technological platform.  
And today that wireless platform brings cellular networks and the Internet to the ears and 
eyes of that same young girl or boy (or their grandchild).   
¶49 In Pacifica, the “intrusion” trumped the parent’s control of the radio’s on/off 
switch: “To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears 
indecent language is like saying the remedy for an assault is to run after the first blow.”148  
But compare the treatment of censorship in print where one scholar remarks that “[the] 
precedential remedy for visual indecency is not state censorship, but private censorship—
namely, for offended viewers to avert their eyes.”149  
¶50 If the “intrusion” doctrine falls apart on technological grounds, then Pacifica 
“becomes only a case about children and the First Amendment.”150  Indeed, the Pacifica 
 
information technology sector that you represent is so exhilarating because of what it 
promises, what it can do, the way it can transform the world.  Sure, there are things that might 
be scary about it, but you got a selling job to do, you’ve got to convince the people with the 
power to make your lives difficult and the First Amendment costly, that it’s really worth 
preserving what makes this nation special. 
146 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 220. 
147 See generally Editorial, Facebook’s Wise Privacy Move, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A24, 
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0528-facebook-
20100528,0,2037315.story.  The editorial states: 
 It's one thing for the Federal Trade Commission to hold companies to the promises they 
make to their users; it's another for lawmakers to try to design privacy policies for sites whose 
technical capabilities are constantly advancing, along with their users' demand for services 
and attitudes about privacy.  As Zuckerberg has noted, Facebook triggered outrage when it 
started sending users' updates automatically to all of their friends.  Now that kind of "news 
feed" is a central feature of just about every social network.  What looks like a threat today 
may prove to be an asset tomorrow.   
Id. 
148 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
149 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 221 (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). 
150 Id. at 221.  Professor Tribe explains:   
Who decides?  Should it be parents or should it be the government that decides what 
information is made available.  So the broad lesson of this discussion of television violence is 
the centrality of the First Amendment’s opposition to having government as Big Brother 
regulate who many provide information what information content to whom whether or not for 
a price . . .  In a world where grownups understandably fear for themselves and their children 
and worry about the brave new world of online cyberreality that their kids can navigate more 
fluently than they can, in that kind of world, it is enormously tempting to forget or to 
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case has been interpreted to depend less on the broadcast distinction and more upon the 
narrow area of speech that is indecent to children.151  If so, then the analysis of content-
based regulations should be narrowly tailored with a compelling government interest 
under a strict scrutiny standard of review—generalizing the law while restoring a full 
First Amendment for the electronic press.  If concerns arise for regulations to protect 
children from the brave new world of cybermedia, the broadcast exception based upon 
pervasiveness need not merit greater deference by the courts.152   
B. Attempts to Reframe Red Lion for Digital Media 
¶51 Since 1969, courts and litigators considered Red Lion limited to its facts after the 
reversal of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine policy in 1987.  In oral arguments of Fox 
Television Stations v. FCC, on remand to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, one judge described the case as a mere red herring for purposes of legal 
analysis.153   
¶52 Yet, the Red Lion opinion remains valuable to some regulatory agendas.  The 
precedent creates a model in which regulators can plausibly intervene when the market is 
found to provide too little speech of high value, such as serious, investigative 
journalism,154 or too much speech of low value, such as amateur, wasteful, or harmful 
 
subordinate the vital principles of Constitutional liberty, and even if after years of litigation 
and expenditure, the First Amendment prevails, it can be worn down dramatically by having 
to wage that fight over and over and over.  Essentially, it’s a cultural problem, it’s a problem 
of persuading politicians and the public that the vital principles of freedom of speech do not 
lose their vitality, do not lose their centrality, to who we are as a nation, who we are as a 
people, simply because we live in a scary, brave new world. 
Tribe, Plenary Address, supra note 4, at 55:00–56:00. 
151 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 221 n.52. 
152 Content regulations outside of the broadcasting medium are scrutinized under a strict scrutiny 
standard requiring a compelling government interest.  See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989).   
153 Oral Arguments, America and the Courts at 19:30, C-SPAN (Jan. 16, 2010),  
http://38.105.88.161/Watch/Media/2010/01/16/AC/A/28406/AC+Fox+Television+v+FCC.aspx 
(“Is it a red herring instead of a Red Lion?”).  In response, Miguel Estrada said, “It is quite probably that 
your honor because the very most that the Commission gets out of that line of cases leading up to the 
Pacifica cases is intermediate scrutiny, and I think we can readily demonstrate that the commission’s 
actions in these cases really flunk intermediate and strict scrutiny.”  Id.  See also Marvin Ammori, The 
Fairness Doctrine: A Flawed Means to Attain a Noble Goal, Symposium: Does Red Lion Still Roar? Public 
Interest Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 
893 (2009) (“Debate about the Fairness Doctrine is a red herring, as the Doctrine will not and should not be 
reinstated.  Assertions by conservatives that Democrats are attempting to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine are 
inaccurate.  The Doctrine is easy to avoid and difficult to enforce, making reinstatement of the Doctrine 
ineffective at best.”). 
154  See Federal Trade Commission, Address at From Town Criers to Bloggers: How Will Journalism 
Survive the Internet Age? (June 15, 2010), available at 
http://ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/100615transcript.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).  Several 
panelists discussed the importance of “serious journalism” or “Big J” journalism where beat reporters and 
foreign correspondents fulfill a valuable societal role in investigating government power.  See also Lili 
Levi, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulation, Symposium: Does Red Lion Still Roar? Public 
Interest Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 
814 (2009).  Professor Levi explains:   
With the advent of cable television, over-the-air broadcasters faced many new competitors 
able to focus on narrower audience segments.  As the blogging phenomenon and websites 
such as YouTube have contributed to the growth of Internet media, the market has become 
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speech.155  Such determinations are subject to administrative procedures set in law and 
cannot be “arbitrary and capricious.”156  But otherwise the finding of market failure 
requires simply three of five votes at the Federal Communications Commission.  Even 
when FCC content regulation has visibly chilled free speech, as with the Fairness 
Doctrine,157 or failed to promote its announced goals, as with educational programming 
for children,158 the hurdle is not a high one.159  It requires control by the proper political 
coalition rather than a compelling set of facts.    
¶53 In today’s digital world, speakers aggregate around amateur, political, corporate, 
and niche interests, crowding across formerly siloed distribution channels.160  It would be 
 
further fragmented.  The effect is to leave broadcasters and newspapers with much smaller 
audiences and greater financial pressures.  While the new media environment may well 
provide a greater variety of viewpoints and opportunities for self expression, it does not make 
up for the lost resources for traditional journalism . . . .   
Id. at 815 (emphasis added). 
155 See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience (University of Pennsylvania Law School, Scholarship at Penn Law Research Paper No. 09-33, 
2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=upenn_wps (discussing 
the inevitability of intermediation and the phenomenon of control of unwanted content and identification of 
good content).  For popular commentary on the quality of speech on the Internet today, see, e.g., ANDREW 
KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR:  HOW TODAY’S INTERNET IS KILLING OUR CULTURE (2007); NICHOLAS 
CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010). 
156 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  
157 Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence 
from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 279–301 (1997); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
158 The FCC adopted “kid-vid” rules following the Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
437, 104 Stat. 996-1000 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2006)).  FCC rules generally 
require television stations to “provide parents and consumers with advance information about core 
programs being aired; define the type of programs that qualify as core programs; and air at least three hours 
per week of core programs.”  Children’s Educational Television, FCC (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/childtv.html.  For commentary on the efficacy and arguable failure 
of the kid-vid legislation, see MINOW & LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND, supra note 25, at 105–
136.  See also Robert Corn-Revere, Regulation in Newspeak: The FCC Children Television Rules (Cato 
Institute, Policy Analysis No. 268, 1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-268.html.  
159 This lends itself to the question of what constitutes an ideal speech marketplace.  Note the 
controversy between one radio station and the FCC on “meritorious” foreign language programming and 
the fulfillment of adequate monitoring and logging of such time-brokered content.  In Cosmopolitan 
Broadcasting, the D.C. Circuit found:     
The following is a breakdown of WHBI's weekly foreign language programming in 1969: 
Spanish (45.5 hours); Italian (35.5 hours); Greek (10 hours); Hungarian (4 hours); Arabic (2.5 
hours); Polish (2.75 hours); Brazilian (2.05 hours); Portuguese (2 hours); Lithuanian (1 hour); 
Slovakian (55 minutes); Croatian (.5 hours); Albanian (.5 hours); Ukranian (.5 hours); 
Roumanian  [sic] (.5 hours); Armenian (.5 hours); Yugoslavian (.5 hours); Bulgarian (.5 
hours); Norwegian (.5 hours). Reply brief for appellant, Appendix A at Exhibit # 6. By 1972, 
WHBI also broadcast in Korean, Macedonian, Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, Japanese, and Russian.  
WHBI, Exhibit # 6, Supplemental Joint Appendix (S.J.A.) at 31–58. 
Cosmopolitan Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917, 919 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (cited in Richard A. 
Epstein, What Broadcast Licenses Tell Us about Net Neutrality: Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corporation v. 
FCC, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 85, 96 n.21 (Randolph J. May ed., 2009)).   
160 Popular and academic analysts see the changing nature of the written word in a post-modern, media-
saturated environment, and its implications on digital politics.  The persuasiveness of the digital written 
word may depend less upon words itself, where modern culture finds itself philosophically lost between 
“originality” and “authenticity” of expression.  See Andrew Keen, Hunger Artists, in BARNES AND NOBLE 
REVIEW (May 26, 2010), http://bnreview.barnesandnoble.com/t5/Public-and-Private/Hunger-Artists/ba-
p/2680; ANDREW POTTER, THE AUTHENTICITY HOAX: HOW WE GET LOST FINDING OURSELVES (2010) 
 76
Vol. 9:3] Thomas W. Hazlett et al. 
curious if regulators were to ignore these emerging channels of communication.  Instead, 
one expects that they will naturally consider extending existing regimes to encompass 
new content, speakers, and aggregators.  Ideas are already sprouting, including legal 
interventions to promote speaker diversity, pre-empt community echo-chambers,161 
identify and advance serious journalism, mandate transparency requirements for search 
engines delivering commercial or political speech, and constrain ISPs and device 
platforms which design features for closed networks.162  Policy innovators have already 
begun to divert the Red Lion regulatory path toward digital media.163   
1. Diversity of Viewpoints and Group Polarization 
¶54 The policy goal of promoting diversity and civility in speech, on its face, is not 
generally objectionable.  However, the institution of a lower level of judicial scrutiny for 
such rules is a detriment to the First Amendment.  Such rules would not appear overtly 
content-specific, as obviously as the Fairness Doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s.164  
However, a greater number of harmful speech categories may emerge as targets of 
regulation with less scrutiny from the judicial branch and overbroad restrictions that chill 
otherwise protected speech.  Examples of categories include hate speech, campus speech 
codes, and protection of children from violence.165  Such speech may travel upon private 
 
(exploring traditional frameworks of truth, meaning, mass culture, and modernity).  In a digital media 
environment, content is frequently derivative upon other content, raising important copyright implications.  
Political or cultural digital memes can also have viral and explosive effect, with enough truth to be passed 
along to another.  See also FARHAD MANJOO, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING TO LIVE IN A POST-FACT SOCIETY 
(2008) (exploring “truthiness,” selective exposure, peripheral processing, conspiracy theories, disjunction 
between truth and proof).    
161 Sunstein, Keynote, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 6, at 771, 778 (describing echo chambers in the 
modern information landscape compared to the public forum values of Red Lion).  See also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007); id. at 25 (discussing the nature of a “public forum” in the modern 
era); id. at 32 (discussing the limitations of the public forum doctrine subsidized by taxpayers with that of 
the goal of republican self-government); id. at 73 (comparing “second-order diversity” with diversity 
within a speaker group); id. at 206 (“‘Must carry’ has no legitimate role on the Internet”); id. at 207 
(exploring concepts of access rights, must-carry rules, and advertiser access to viewer attention on the 
web). 
162 See infra notes 169–181; Ammori, The Fairness Doctrine, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 153, at 
893; Sunstein, Keynote, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 6, at 778; Levi, Four Eras, Red Lion Symposium, 
supra note 154, at 815; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Irrelevant Wasteland: An Exploration of Why Red 
Lion Doesn’t Matter (Much) in 2008, The Crucial Importance of the Information Revolution, and the 
Continuing Relevance of the Public Interest Standard in Regulating Access to Spectrum, Symposium: Does 
Red Lion Still Roar? Public Interest Media Regulation Forty Years After Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 911, 921–22, 941 (2009). 
163 Krotoszynski, Irrelevant Wasteland, Red Lion Symposium, supra note162, at 942 (“If Red Lion's 
embrace of the public interest concept can be redefined and redeployed to advance these objectives, 
perhaps the next retrospective symposium ten or twenty years from now will be able to celebrate the 
decision's importance in helping to realize the full possibility of the information revolution.”). 
164 Ammori, Fairness Doctrine, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 153, at 893 (“Rather than debate a 
[fairness] doctrine that will not pass, Congress and the FCC should encourage diverse ownership of 
traditional media and open, high-speed Internet access as the most appropriate means of making diverse 
viewpoints available to the public.”). 
165 The Future of Media inquiry by the FCC solicited comments on the changing composition of digital 
speech and community speech needs.  Some scholars question the institutional wisdom of such an inquiry.  
See Glen O. Robinson, The FCC’s “Future of Media Project”: Let Them Eat Broccoli, PERSPECTIVES 
FROM FSF SCHOLARS, May 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Let_Them_Eat_Broccoli.pdf.  Filed comments have raised 
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networks, such as email listservs, which promote the halflife of particular conspiracy 
theories, dehumanizing speech, and anti-social incivility.  Such email listservs would be 
read by a limited, polarized group of people, without a right of reply or neutral forum to 
provide fact-checking or rebuttal.  For the same rationale as the Fairness Doctrine, some 
public interest advocates may see the need to neutralize speech deemed hyperbolic, 
irresponsible, or politically mischievous.  
¶55 In response to this phenomenon, one scholar’s group polarization theory says that 
increasingly customizable and “Daily Me” media delivery may lead to increased 
extremism among factions of citizens.166  The strategy of Red Lion’s “public forum” 
regulation167 is a blunt, but available, instrument in the eyes of some, that would provide 
limits on deemed dangerous speech if private solutions prove less than satisfactory.168    
¶56 The regulatory failure of the Fairness Doctrine should inform this discussion.  The 
capability of governing institutions to define, legislate, and enforce such speech 
restrictions weighs down the regulatory calculus significantly.  The value of promoting 
civility and respect among citizens is undisputed; however, feasibility wanes in light of 
the capacity of elected and civil servants to create content-specific and content-neutral 
structures to manage speech around changing cultural and political norms. 
¶57 Yet, policymakers may still see the threat as so great as to justify government 
prophylaxis or remedy.  The narrative has been presented as such: digital media may 
enable and promote greater stratification of citizens into homogeneous communities of 
acutely differentiated opinions.169  As a free-standing theory, cognitive bias in digital 
 
issues about variable levels of hate speech on digital media.  See Comments of National Media Coalition 
(“NHMNC”), In the Matter of Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities in a Digital Age, 
GN Docket No. 10-25 (FCC May 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.nhmc.org/sites/default/files/NHMC%20et%20al.%20Future%20of%20Media%20Comment.pd
f; Matthew Lasar, FCC Asked to Monitor “Hate Speech,” “Misinformation” Online, ARS TECHNICA BLOG, 
(May 31, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2010/05/should-the-government-keep-tabs-on-
hate-speech.ars. 
166 See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Daily We: Is the Internet Really a Blessing for Democracy?, THE 
BOSTON REV., Summer 2001, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.3/sunstein.php; Cass R. Sunstein 
& Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 08-03, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084585.  “Because those who hold 
conspiracy theories typically suffer from a ‘crippled epistemology,’ in accordance with which it is rational 
to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups.  Various 
policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to rebut conspiracy theories or to 
ignore them, are explored in this light.”  Id.  See generally Glenn Greenwald, Obama Confidant’s Spine-
Chilling Proposal, SALON (Jan. 15, 2010, 7:16 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/01/15/sunstein/index.html. 
167 Compare the Chinese approach of Internet speech regulation for one jurisdiction’s attempt to 
maintain law and order among a diverse population of 4 billion people.  See Chinese Government Spells 
Out Internet Restrictions After Google’s Exit, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 7, 2010), 
http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-08/china-spells-out-restrictions-on-speech-over-internet-
after-google-s-exit.html.  China’s State Council Information Office said in a 31-page policy paper that no 
organization can spread “superstitious ideas,” publish material which can disrupt “social order and 
stability,” and “other content forbidden by laws and administrative regulations.”  Id.  The report maintains 
that Chinese citizens “can voice their opinions in various ways on the Internet,” “[w]ith their right to 
freedom of speech on the Internet protected by the law.”  Id.    
168Sunstein, Keynote, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 6, at 778.  “It is quite possible that what we 
should do now is nothing.  It will be most intriguing to hear what the panelists have to say about ways of 
reviving Red Lion's admirable ends in a communications universe where Red Lion's means are most ill-
suited.  One question is whether a great deal can be done privately, not publicly.”  Id. 
169 Mass media studies have addressed the “news” and “entertainment” distinction, “dissonance” theory 
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speech invites empirical and cultural inquiry.170  However, the choice of how to approach 
such changes in digital politics depends on an affirmative or negative view of the First 
Amendment.  An affirmative view of the First Amendment would promote greater 
deference and less scrutiny toward policies that actively engage in the content-specific 
realm.171  On the other hand, an enumerated rights view of the First Amendment would 
promote more scrutiny of legislation and rulemaking.   
2. Structural, Content-Neutral Regulation of Networks 
¶58 Structural constraints upon corporate ownership and concentration provide another 
approach to promote public interest values on digital media.  Such content-neutral 
regulation involves speech regulation in some form, as acknowledged by scholars 
concerned about digital speech.172  One scholar writes:  
¶59 If the most significant public interest role of radio and television today could be to 
provide credible journalism . . . and if . . . a market-based conception of the public 
interest is unlikely to promote such journalism . . . then the Commission can indirectly 
regulate media structure to induce more investment in such fare.173   
¶60 The flow of content and the market structure of platforms would also bring search 
engines into the mix.  One scholar suggests FCC power to moderate ground rules for 
search.  This scholar writes: “If a particular search engine sells the right to rig search 
results, consumers should be aware of this fact.  If a search engine blocks content (for 
whatever reason), this too should be disclosed.”174   
¶61 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor described the nature of structural content-neutral 
regulations in her partial dissent in Turner II, which approved must-carry rights of 
broadcasting programming onto cable TV.  She specifically took issue with the 
 
of communication “where people tend to discount messages that are at variance with their a priori 
expectations,” and the demand for mass media messages where “[t]he empirical work on persuasion and 
attitude change does suggest that it is extraordinarily difficult to make people believe things they are not 
already inclined to believe.”  BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA 
STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–12 (1975) (citing LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE 28 (1957); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 49 (1964); HAROLD A. INNIS, 
THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 39 (1951)).   
170 See Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Ideological Segregation Online and Offline (NBER 
Working Paper No. 15916, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15916 (“We find that 
ideological segregation of online news consumption is low in absolute terms, higher than the segregation of 
most offline news consumption, and significantly lower than the segregation of face-to-face interactions 
with neighbors, co-workers, or family members.  We find no evidence that the Internet is becoming more 
segregated over time.”); David Brooks, Riders on the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at A21, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20brooks.html. 
171 Sunstein, Keynote, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 6, at 771 (“What I'm going to try to connect this 
group polarization finding with is what I'm going to call the positive or affirmative side of the First 
Amendment.  If there is any single point that comes out of this, it should be the difficulties and 
complexities in the system of self-sorting that Red Lion's demise has helped unleash on the country.”).   
172 The determination of whether a regulation is a content regulation explicitly or a structural regulation 
that promotes and limits the freedoms of certain speakers through access requirements, must-carry, is a 
topic of increasingly important First Amendment discussion.  See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 186 (raising the analysis of Palko and footnote 4 to Carolene 
Products, affecting the view that the First Amendment “occupied a ‘preferred position’ in a constitutional 
hierarchy.”).  
173 Levi, Four Eras, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 154, at 816. 
174 Krotoszynski, Irrelevant Wasteland, Red Lion Symposium, supra note 162, at 941. 
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determination that access to local content was a content-neutral regulation that did not 
warrant strict scrutiny review as content-specific regulation would.  She wrote, “[t]his is 
why the Court is mistaken in concluding that the interest in diversity—in ‘access to a 
multiplicity’ of ‘diverse and antagonistic sources,’ is content-neutral.  Indeed, the interest 
is not ‘related to the suppression of free expression,’ but that is not enough for content 
neutrality.”175  With the bundling of more content through the Internet, her words are 
more apt than ever: “The interest in giving a tax break to religious, sports, or professional 
magazines is not related to the suppression of speech; the interest in giving labor 
picketers an exemption from a general picketing ban is not related to the suppression of 
speech.”176  Justice O’Connor continues, “[b]ut they are both related to the content of 
speech—to its communicative impact.  The interest in ensuring access to a multiplicity of 
diverse and antagonistic sources of information, no matter how praiseworthy, is directly 
tied to the content of what the speakers will likely say.”177   
¶62 Red Lion as a regulatory public interest case retains relevance today among some 
policymakers.178  As a refresher in a digital media world, this Article will now invite 
close scrutiny on the facts and doctrine of Red Lion from an earlier era to question the 
retention of such a doctrine in a digital media environment. 
IV. FACTUAL LIMITS OF RED LION 
¶63 Red Lion, decided on June 9, 1969, was decided on the trifecta of factual error, 
economic error, and technological error.  First, the Court did not have a factual record to 
support the conclusion that the Fairness Doctrine did not actually impose self-censorship 
on radio and television broadcasters.179  Second, the Court perpetuated a blunder of 
 
175 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 678 (1997) (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (footnotes and citations omitted).  
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Red Lion proponents have generated scholarly work recently.  See Anthony E. Varona, Toward A 
Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 103 (2009) (“Broadband can deliver the 
electronic free marketplace of ideas that was the elusive, and perhaps impossible, dream of the broadcast 
regulatory regime.  But it will not be able to do so without the significant and proactive involvement of the 
federal government.”); Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 97, 98 (2003) (“The article concludes that public interest regulation is not in 
constitutional jeopardy as a result of the advent of digital technology.  Broadcast licenses remain scarce, 
and the scarcity doctrine remains good law.”); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New 
Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (1997) 
(“This Article seeks to go beyond the scarcity rationale and place broadcast regulation on firmer First 
Amendment footing.  It finds a doctrinal basis for upholding broadcast regulation under the Court's public 
forum doctrine.”). 
179 Speaking of the Fairness Doctrine and the appurtenant Personal Attack Rule and Political Editorial 
Rule, the Red Lion court said: “[I]f experience with the administration of those doctrines indicates that they 
have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time 
enough to reconsider the constitutional implications.”  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 
(1969).  The FCC produced just such a showing in 1985.  That finding was supported by the finding of 
post-Fairness Doctrine radio market, which empirically revealed the existence of a chilling effect.  Thomas 
W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the 
Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 301 (1997); Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, 
“Chilling” the Internet?  Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 35 (1998). 
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economic logic,180 misperceiving the standard economic condition of scarcity as 
unique.181  Third, the “physical” limits thought to reside in the special nature of radio 
waves were wrong.  While generating greater bandwidth is generally a costly exercise, 
there is no set number of frequencies—or radio licenses—that can be defined in nature.  
The restrictions result from conflict among rival users and the legal rules for resolving 
such conflicts.  Notwithstanding the numerous lacunae embedded in the decision, Red 
Lion remains the foundation for the reduced First Amendment rights afforded 
broadcasters, relative to other media, today.182   
A. The Chill of the Fairness Doctrine 
¶64 In late November 1964, Reverend John Norris, who owned the radio station 
WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania, sold fifteen minutes of airtime to the Reverend Billy 
James Hargis for $7.50 for Hargis’s Christian Crusade program.  Reverend Hargis thus 
broadcasted his views on WGCB as well as 200 other stations,183 taking two minutes 
during the program to criticize Fred Cook, author of “Goldwater—Extremist on the 
Right.”184  Cook complained to the FCC about Hargis’s comments and demanded equal 
time to respond.185  Norris offered him fifteen minutes for $7.50, but Cook declined, 
demanding free airtime under the Fairness Doctrine and the related Personal Attack 
Rule.186  The FCC granted Cook the free time and Norris pressed his First Amendment 
rights against the order.187  Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Norris’s 
claim and sustained the doctrine on the grounds that the airwaves are scarce.188 
 
180 The blunder is attributable to Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 
(1943).  That decision, holding that First Amendment protections could not apply to a medium if there were 
not unlimited opportunities to speak, prompted economist Ronald Coase’s seminal 1959 article, see Coase, 
The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2.  Coase’s argument, therein, and as presented in R. 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), formed the basis of the citation in his 
Nobel Prize in Economics awarded in 1991. 
181 NBC, 319 U.S. at 190. 
182 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, (1978); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 
(1994). 
183 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371.  See FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, supra note 19. 
184 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371, 372 n.2. 
185 Id. at 371–72.  For more context on the Cook-Hargis dispute, see generally, Fred J. Cook, Radio 
Right: Hate Clubs of the Air, THE NATION, May 25, 1964, available at 
http://live.thenation.com/archive/detail/13231256.  “Right-wing fanatics, casting doubt on the loyalty of 
every President of the United States since Herbert Hoover, are pounding the U.S. people, this Presidential 
election year, with an unprecedented flood of radio and television propaganda.”  Id.  “The hate clubs of the 
air are spewing out a minimum of 6,600 broadcasts a week, carried by more than 1,300 radio and television 
stations-nearly one out of every five in the nation-in a blitz that saturates every one of the fifty states with 
the exception of Maine.”  Id.  KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra 
note 5, at 190 n.60.  See ABC News, Fairness Doctrine Abolished, supra note 20 (providing archived video 
of an ABC’s News Washington report on the FCC’s vote to overturn the Fairness Doctrine). 
186 Cook, supra note 185. 
187 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 372. 
188 Id. at 367.  The vote in Red Lion was 8-0, with Justice William O. Douglas recused.  He later wrote 
that he would have dissented had he been available to hear the case.  Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I did not participate in that 
decision and, with all respect, would not support it.  The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First 
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¶65 Key facts omitted in the record are these: the challenge by Cook to Norris’s 
editorial policy was part and parcel of a campaign to create a chilling effect via requests 
for equal time.189  The WGCB broadcast was not heard by Fred Cook himself, but was 
monitored by an extensive operation established by the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) for the purpose of filing Fairness Doctrine challenges against right-wing 
broadcasters.190  This group of DNC-funded media monitors was formed after President 
John F. Kennedy’s experience with conservative radio shows during the 1962 campaign 
to gain passage of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.191   
¶66 Political operative Wayne Phillips had been chosen to head the radio watchdog 
effort.  He wrote: “Even more important than the free radio time was the effectiveness of 
this operation in inhibiting the political activity of these right-wing broadcasts.”192  One 
of Phillips’s assistants, Martin Firestone, a former FCC lawyer, wrote in a memo that the 
DNC’s efforts were paying dividends in that they “may have inhibited the stations in their 
broadcast of more radical and politically partisan programs.”193  The large broadcasters 
and mainstream viewpoints were not at risk of being hurt according to Firestone:  
The right-wingers operate on a strictly cash basis and it is for this reason that 
they are carried by so many small stations.  Were our efforts to be continued on a 
year-round basis, we would find that many of these stations would consider the 
broadcasts of these programs bothersome and burdensome (especially if they are 
ultimately required to give us free time) and would start dropping the programs 
from their broadcast schedule.194   
Bill Ruder, another operative of the effort and an assistant secretary of commerce in the 
Kennedy administration, also later testified: “Our massive strategy was to use the 
Fairness Doctrine to challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters and hope that the 
challenges would be so costly to them that they would be inhibited and decide it was too 
expensive to continue.”195 
¶67 The Supreme Court’s holding depended upon the presumption that broadcasters 
were not “irresistibly forced to self-censorship.”196  For this point, the Red Lion decision 
cited a statement by Frank Stanton, president of CBS, at the Sigma Delta Chi National 
Convention from November 21, 1968.  Stanton stated, “[W]e are determined to continue 
covering controversial issues as a public service, and exercising our own independent 
news judgment and enterprise.  I, for one, refuse to allow that judgment and enterprise to 
be affected by official intimidation.”197  
¶68 Privately, Stanton was apparently not so outspoken about broadcasters’ 
independence when privately confronted by federal regulators.  In an internal White 
 
Amendment regime.”). 
189 Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 3, at 933–34. 
190 FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 34–49. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 41 (quoting Wayne Phillips). 
193 Id. at 41–42 (quoting Martin Firestone). 
194 Id. at 42 (quoting Martin Firestone). 
195 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 5, at 115, 197–212 (quoting Bill Ruder). 
196 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). 
197 Id. at 393 n.19 (quoting Frank Stanton, President, Columbia Broadcasting System, Keynote Address 
at Sigma Delta Chi National Convention (Nov. 21, 1968)). 
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House memorandum dated September 25, 1970 that was made public during the 
Watergate investigation, Nixon administration attorney Charles W. Colson described his 
efforts to “inhibit . . . the networks” and “eliminate once and for all loyal opposition type 
programs.”198  He detailed his meetings with three network chief executives regarding 
President Nixon’s views of their news reporting.199  He boastfully indicated the pressure 
of self-censorship:  
The networks are terribly nervous over the uncertain state of the law, i.e., the 
recent FCC decisions and the pressures to grant Congress access to TV.  They are 
also apprehensive about us . . . .  The harder I pressed them [CBS and NBC] the 
more accommodating, cordial, and almost apologetic they became . . . .  There 
was unanimous agreement that the President’s right of access to TV should in no 
way be restrained.  Both CBS and ABC agreed with me that on most occasions 
the President speaks as President and there is no obligation for presenting a 
contrasting view under the Fairness Doctrine.  (This, by the way is not the law.  
The FCC has always ruled that the Fairness Doctrine always applies and either 
they don’t know that or they are willing to concede us that point.) . . . .  NBC, on 
the other hand, argues that the Fairness test must be applied to every speech but 
[Julian] Goodman [president of NBC] is also quick to agree that there are 
probably instances in which Presidential addresses are not controversial . . . .  To 
my surprise, CBS did not deny that the news had been slanted against us.  [CBS 
Chairman William] Paley merely said that every Administration has felt the same 
way and that we have been slower in coming to them to complain than our 
predecessors.  He, however, ordered Stanton in my presence to review the 
analysis with me and if the news has been slanted to see that the situation is 
immediately corrected . . . .  CBS does not defend the O’Brien appearance.  Paley 
wanted to make it very clear it would not happen again and that they would not 
permit partisan attacks on the President.  They are doggedly determined to win 
their FCC case, however, as a matter of principle; even though they recognize 
they made a mistake, they don’t want the FCC in the business of correcting their 
mistakes.200 
The implications of the Colson memos are clear: When the government exercises 
discretion that controls the financial fortunes of a broadcast licensee, nervousness of the 
broadcast licensee is entirely predictable.  Indeed, the government leverages this 
nervousness.201  The privately reported beliefs of the president of CBS on the relationship 
between broadcasters and the state show that “the chilling effect is found to be alive and 
frigid.”202  Stanton’s testimony on the chilling effect, relied on by the Supreme Court to 
suggest that none was in evidence, cannot be taken at face value.  Intimidation via 
licensing shows up in regulation by a “raised eyebrow,”203 not in public complaints that 
 
198 FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 131. 
199 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 214. 
200 FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 131–32; 
Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 214 (quoting report by Charles W. Colson). 
201 Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 3, at 937. 
202 Id. 
203 Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam). 
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risk regulatory sanction.  In practice, the Fairness Doctrine did, indeed, chill TV 
broadcasters.   
B. Stronger First Amendment Rights for Spectrum Licensees 
¶69 The solution, then, to the self-censorship and chilling effects from greater content 
regulation is to vest current licensees with greater First Amendment rights.  This 
adjustment to the regulatory regime would not be a radical departure from the current 
licensing regime.  In fact, the rules on public interest obligations have been relaxed and 
no harm has followed.204 
¶70 If there is a public interest rationale for subsidizing localism, diversity of 
viewpoints, or kid-vid rules, then this should be done transparently through licenses 
dedicated to public broadcasting.  That has been the “good government” reform for four 
decades.  In the late 1970s, Congressman Lionel Van Deerlin (D-CA), head of the House 
Telecom Subcommittee, proposed dropping “public interest” obligations like the Fairness 
Doctrine, which he found did not work.  He proposed imposing a 2% tax on broadcasters’ 
gross receipt.205  The money was to endow public broadcasting, allowing it to receive 
funding without political jockeying in each year’s budget process, although some 
questioned the management of such a fund for independent public broadcasting.206   In 
 
204 Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio 
Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581, 588–89 (1998) (describing the FCC’s gradual and productive deregulation 
of public interest requirements and renewal expectancies, resulting in strengthened property rights for 
licensees and increased value, investment incentives, and likelihood of amortization and recoupment).  
Shelanski and Huber note the FCC’s movement away from “government determination of how private 
licensees use spectrum.”  Id. at 606.  They chronicle a long established deregulatory path which did not 
result in chaotic disruption of the spectrum market.  Relaxed rules administered upon licensees are 
described in their article under the subheadings of: renewal and revocation, id. at 585, transfer and 
trafficking, id. at 589, usage rights as the freedom to occupy and subdivide, id. at 592, usage flexibility, id. 
at 595, the right to choose who gets access, id. at 597, and, closing the conduit: exclusion of receivers, id. at 
600.  See also Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless 
"Carriage," 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1997) (describing FCC deregulation of licensee requirements 
upon direct broadcast satellite (DBS) spectrum compared to traditional “public interest” regulation of 
broadcast spectrum, reducing “the potential role and effect of conventional ‘broadcast’ regulation”).  For a 
comprehensive review of the origins of spectrum regulation and the “broadcasting” category, see id. at 
1050–62. 
205 See Mark Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. 
L. REV. 207, 248 n.172 (1982) (“The fee would have been based on the costs of processing the license and 
the value of the spectrum and would have gone to a ‘telecommunications fund’ to support federal 
regulation, public broadcasting, minority ownership of stations, and rural telecommunications.  H.R. 
13,015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 413 (1978).”); Note, A Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial 
Television Entertainment, 89 YALE L.J. 694, 712–13 (1980) (footnotes omitted).  “The 1979 proposal—the 
most recent draft of what is known as the Van Deerlin Bill—did not purport to convey inalienable property 
rights, but did declare that economic forces—not government regulation—are the best device for public 
control of the airwaves.”  Id.  “Its most controversial feature, the annual spectrum resource fee,  would have 
required broadcasters to pay back some of their profits for the privilege of their licenses, but the legislation 
would have abolished any vestige of public interest control over the mass-audience economics of 
entertainment programming.”  Id. at 712–13.  “The Van Deerlin Bill was withdrawn after receiving 
unfavorable comments from broadcasters and audience-representatives alike.”  Id. at 713. 
206 Note, A Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial Television Entertainment, 89 YALE L.J. 
694, 713 n.129 (1980) (noting a recommendation by the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public 
Broadcasting for $590 million in federal funding for independent public broadcasting, skeptical of the 
efficacy of a proposed spectrum fee deregulated from public interest control of private mass-audience 
programming). 
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1998, Henry Geller told the Gore Commission on the Public Interest Obligations of 
Digital TV Broadcasters that requiring such licensees to provide time for educational 
programs for children and free airtime for candidates for public office was a proven 
failure.207  He also advocated a tax on broadcast licenses for the use of public 
broadcasters.208  The Commission rejected his suggestions, but at least two members—
Gigi Sohn of Public Knowledge and co-chair Norman Ornstein of the American 
Enterprise Institute—have come to embrace them.209  In 2008, seeing the neglect of the 
obligations that Geller had predicted ten years previously, these policy analysts reversed 
course to concede that the only effective way to promote the announced goals was 
directly through subsidies.210 
¶71 There is a counterargument: subsidies for one set of programmers carry their own 
First Amendment risks.  In addition, budget allocation issues encroach.  What this 
argument does establish, however, is that the mechanism for eliminating the regulatory 
requirements associated with public interest licensing is easily established.  Indeed, it is 
commonly advanced as the “good government” alternative to the failed system of “quid 
pro quo” regulation which—under Red Lion—allegedly seeks to repair market failure by 
supporting the provision of public goods.  This process played out visibly in 1987, when 
the Fairness Doctrine was abolished.  No disruption occurred in the marketplace.  Indeed, 
AM radio underwent a resurgence, as “news,” “talk,” and “news/talk” formats flourished.  
The next step, authorizing more liberal rights to use the broadcast bands in radio and 
especially television, would unleash even more competition.   
¶72 Indeed, the liberalization of use of the TV bands would enable advanced mobile 
broadband, extending Internet access much further, and with greater capacity—helping to 
give both Internet “speakers” and “listeners” far greater ability to communicate.  These 
gains are estimated, in economic terms, to total over $1 trillion.211  Far from disrupting 
the marketplace, pushing broadcast airwaves into a more competitive mode in which 
airwaves could be used for their most popular employments would spur tremendous 
innovation and consumer welfare.    
 
207 Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341 
(1998).  
208 Henry Geller explains:   
The new approach would substitute a modest spectrum usage fee for the public fiduciary 
obligation. Congress could reasonably establish such a fee based on a percentage of gross 
advertising revenues, (e.g., 1% for radio and 3% for television).  This fee might then be set in 
a long term contract, for example, fifteen years, between the FCC and the broadcaster, so that 
it would be exempt from the effects of government policy changes toward the media.  The 
sums so garnered would go into a trust fund for public telecommunications.  For the first 
time, we would have a policy working for the achievement of public service goals. 
Id. at 362 (footnotes omitted). 
209 Information Economy Project at George Mason University School of Law, The Gore Commission, 10 
Years Later: The Public Interest of Digital TV Broadcasters in Perfect Hindsight, GEORGE MASON 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Oct. 3, 2008), http://iep.gmu.edu/gorecommission. 
210 Id. 
211 Richard H. Thaler, The Buried Treasure in Your TV Dial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at BU7, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/business/economy/28view.html. 
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V. DOCTRINAL LIMITS OF RED LION 
¶73 In a 1974 law review article, the late D.C. Circuit Chief Judge David Bazelon 
artfully clarified the role of FCC regulation of broadcast spectrum in light of First 
Amendment principles.212  He began by refuting the scarcity doctrine on several fronts: 
(1) by criticizing the scarcity of frequencies argument; (2) by drawing attention to the 
true scarcity of investment capital; (3) by questioning the means to the end of content 
controls; and (4) by drawing implications of doctrine to governmental regulation.213  This 
reasoning appeared in a subsequent D.C. Circuit decision.214 
A. Scarcity of Licenses 
¶74 Judge Bazelon critiqued the presumption of scarcity that arose from a limited 
number of frequencies.  He doubted whether there was such channel scarcity, at least in 
any sense relevant to First Amendment jurisprudence.215  He wrote:   
¶75 The figures discussed in Red Lion . . . demonstrate a confusion inherent in 
discussions of scarcity.  The only conclusion . . . is that the VHF television channels with 
high market penetration are completely filled.  Thus the scarcity lies in this—there are 
very few VHF television channels linked to a nationwide network with good market 
penetration.216 
¶76 The type of scarcity noted in Red Lion was not from a limited number of 
frequencies available in nature, but rather from a combination of regulatory restrictions 
and market conditions.217  Second, a limit on the number of channels is both technically 
 
212 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 214. 
213 See also Daniel L. Brenner, Toward a True Marketplace for the Marketplace of Ideas, in FREE BUT 
REGULATED, CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW 272, 275 (Daniel L. Brenner & William L. Rivers 
eds., 1982).  “Speaking in 1981 to the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference—an annual 
law/economics meeting held for the benefit of communications policymakers—Senior Judge David L. 
Bazelon reminded listeners to distinguish between market power used to gain an oligopoly in the 
production of news and entertainment and the Pacifica-like power inherent in a medium.”  Id.  “He urged 
policymakers to confront economic power on its own turf, not chase the issue into ‘the hoary swamps of 
government regulation of speech.’”  Id. 
214 Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
215 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 223 n.30 (citing Letter from Elie Able, Dean, Columbia 
University School of Journalism (Feb. 27, 1975)) (“In New York City, for example, there are thirty-seven 
radio (AM) and television (VHF) stations as compared to three newspapers of general circulation.”). 
216 Id. at 223. 
217 Post hoc ergo propter hoc.  See also Silicon Flatirons, Wireless Broadband: Markets, Models and 
Spectrum, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/events.php?id=831 
(concerning a Disruptive Innovation and a Changing Technological Environment panel) (notes on file with 
the authors).  Panelists were asked a question on what is “scarce” regarding spectrum today.  The panelists 
acknowledged the physical nature of electromagnetic spectrum frequency table as one that does not deplete, 
and instead named other “scarce” elements that prohibited innovation.  The resources that are indeed 
“scarce” today when dealing with radio frequencies are: (a) more licenses, (b) advanced antennas, (c) 
ability to make efficient the resource available, (d) capacity upon existing channels, (e) well-defined rights 
for users of frequencies, and (f) proper incentives to promote higher-valued uses of frequencies.  Id.  
Transmissions that depend upon a certain frequency wavelength can start and stop based on the economic 
viability of the broadcaster.  The success of business models upon each wavelength depend on legal, 
economic, and engineering constraints, rather than the ether itself.  See generally Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 27 (“It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the 
radio industry should be to minimize interference.  But this would be wrong.  The aim should be to 
maximize output.”). 
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and artificially created by rationing of licenses, not as a function of economic possibility.  
Along with the limited number of channels, the FCC attached responsibilities along with 
the right to transmit: the “public trustee” duties of a licensed broadcaster were imposed 
without a consideration for the unintended consequences of the degree to which such 
licensing policies would reduce economic rivalry and entrench incumbent interests, 
thereby creating scarcity.   
¶77 Conflicting majority opinions between Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice 
William O. Douglas in CBS et al. v. DNC display the core of this distinction.  Chief 
Justice Warren Burger differentiated “privately owned newspapers and publicly regulated 
broadcast stations.”218  He stated:  
[T]he power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, 
and economic views is bounded by only two factors:  first, the acceptance of a 
sufficient number of readers—and hence advertisers—to assure financial success; 
and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.  A broadcast 
licensee has a large measure of journalistic freedom but not as large as that 
exercised by a newspaper [emphasis added].  A licensee must balance what it 
might prefer to do as a private entrepreneur with what is required to do as a 
“public trustee.”  To perform its statutory duties, the Commission must oversee 
without censoring . . . .219 
Justice Douglas disagreed.  He saw the regulator using the spectrum allocation system to 
generate what economists call “excess demand” for licenses, and then leveraging the 
competition for rights to place “public trustee” obligations on the licensed media outlet.  
This end-run on the First Amendment was not due to atmospheric conditions concerning 
radio frequencies, but was a creation of policy makers to do what the Constitution 
prohibited.  He explained: 
My conclusion is that the TV and radio stand in the same protected position 
under the First Amendment as do newspapers and magazines.  The philosophy of 
the First Amendment requires that result, for the fear that Madison and Jefferson 
had of government intrusion is perhaps even more relevant to TV and radio than 
it is to newspapers and other publications.  That fear was founded not only on the 
spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a faction 
that desired to foist its views of the common good on the people.220 
Fred W. Friendly noted a curious political breakdown in the “shades of opinion”221:  
“[T]he conservative chief of the Court was relying on the Fairness Doctrine as a shield to 
 
218 FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 138. 
219 Id. (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)). 
220 Id. (quoting DNC, 412 U.S. at 94).  Justice Douglas also remarked, “The Fairness Doctrine has no 
place in our First Amendment regime.  It puts the head of the camel inside the tent and enables 
administration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent 
ends.”  DNC, 412 U.S. at 154. 
221 FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 141.  
“The many shades of opinion in CBS et al. v. DNC are confusing, not only because of their conclusions but 
because of who stated them.  Douglas is at least consistent; he will not rest as long as the Fairness Doctrine 
lives.”  Id.  “But White, who wrote the Red Lion decision, and Burger, who ordered the removal of a 
license for WLBT in Lamar Life, used the Fairness Doctrine as a shield to protect radio and television from 
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save broadcasting from the right of access, while the majority’s most liberal member was 
condemning the Doctrine as an affront to the First Amendment.”222  
B. Scarcity of Investment Capital 
¶78 Judge Bazelon refuted another twist of the scarcity argument.  He noted the concern 
that a scarcity of diverse sources of investment capital would result in fewer television 
stations dedicated to diverse programming content.223  At one point, an FCC 
Commissioner commissioner argued that the allocation of only two VHS licenses in 
Jackson, Mississippi would result in racist broadcast programming.224  Judge Bazelon 
redirected the analysis that one must not look solely to the two channels, but to 
substitutes in radio and network news: “It is noteworthy that Mr. Geller does not mention 
radio, nor the fact that the stations broadcast network news . . . another omission from his 
analysis is whether there are other available TV frequencies, cable, UHF or VHF, which 
are open to potential broadcasters in Jackson.”225 
¶79 At bottom, Judge Bazelon revealed that the scarcity of licenses was not a natural 
phenomenon but a social artifact.  As Coase had articulated, it was the choice by policy 
makers, first, to restrict broadcast opportunities to a small number of channels (compared 
to what was possible), and, second, to assign valuable rights by fiat, rather than sell them 
for their market price, that produced excess demand.226  The resulting market outcome 
then supplied a defense of regulation:  not all who sought to broadcast could be licensed.  
This, according to the Government (in a rationale that the courts in NBC and then Red 
Lion accepted), forced the Government to choose.  It was the allegedly necessary process 
of selecting licensees by examining their broadcast programming that permitted 
regulators to use “public interest” criteria.  Coase, and later Bazelon, saw the construction 
of this self-fulfilling policy circle. 
¶80 The analytical weakness of the approach is clearly visible when newspapers are 
compared to broadcasters:  “This ‘scarcity,’ if it may be so called, is not a result of a 
limited number of frequencies and is indeed no different than that associated with 
newspapers.  Scarcity of investment capital in the broadcasting industry seems hardly 
meet as a justification for a different First Amendment regime for TV alone.”227 
¶81 Judge Bazelon noted that major markets have “sixty or more radio stations and six 
TV stations,” which would render the scarcity of investment argument moot.228  He cited 
the Coase paper: “[A]ll economic resources are scarce.  When we say there is a scarcity 
of frequencies, to what are we comparing this scarcity?  In other words, what is the 
 
access by political advertisers, while maintaining it as a sword to prevent broadcasters from engaging in 
one-sided presentations on public issues.”  Id.  “Brennan and Marshall, on the other hand, were unwilling to 
protect broadcasters from the access of partisan advertisers with the financial resources to buy their way 
onto the air.”  Id. 
222 Id. at 139. 
223 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 224 (discussing Henry Geller, Communications Law, 63 
GEO. L.J. 39, 46 (1974)). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 13–19. 
227 Bazelon, supra note 5, at 224. 
228 Id.  
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contrasting ‘multitude’ that is the implicit premise of discussions of scarcity?  Broadcast 
frequencies are scarce in relation to what?”229 
¶82 This economic analysis also extends to the cable TV market.  Judge J. Skelly 
Wright emphasized in Quincy Cable TV: “[W]hatever the outcome of the debate over the 
monopolistic characteristics of cable, the Supreme Court has categorically rejected the 
suggestion that purely economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given 
community justify otherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amendment rights, Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.”230  Judge Bazelon recognized the real impetus for 
regulation facing broadcasting as “simple, old-fashioned concentration of economic 
power and ownership.”231  
C. Diversity and Fairness 
¶83 Judge Bazelon also addressed the concerns of content regulation proponents that 
programming would lack diversity without governmental intervention.  He acknowledged 
that the “key to the scarcity argument is that TV produces greater access to an audience 
than other modes of communication, and thus can be regulated to ensure a diversity of 
ideas in that medium alone.”232  With a strong correction, he said, “But this argument is 
seemingly rejected by the promulgation of the First Amendment . . . .”233   
¶84 First Amendment protections for an independent press conflict frontally with 
regulatory oversight that imposes “fairness” or other content controls on speakers.  
Indeed, the “freedom of speech . . . or of the press” stricture would seem to block any 
concern with the editorial approach of one outlet of expression, trusting diversity across 
outlets to inform the public.  Just as a “liberal” or “conservative” news magazine 
legitimately advances free speech by contributing viewpoints to public debate, so does a 
wireless media provider.  This approach has the added attraction, in addition to extending 
constitutional rights, that it offers a safeguard to Nixonian approaches to license 
renewals.  The Colson Memoranda illustrated those risks.234   
¶85 The First Amendment prevents government from deciding what is “fair” and 
“balanced.”235  An independent press is “absolutely essential to self-government, to 
democracy,”236 especially when “[t]ruth and fairness have a too uncertain quality to 
permit the government to define them.”237  In Associated Press, the court identified 
diversity as a core value of the First Amendment.238  Yet, government actors and 
 
229 Id. at 224 n.36 (“Of course, the scarcity of investment capital in the telecommunications industry for 
UHF and cable development is a result partly of government controls and not solely the product of a free 
market.”); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 2, at 13–19. 
230 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247–56 (1974)); JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 257 n.42 (1991).  
231 Bazelon, FCC Regulation, supra note 5, at 238. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 235.   
235 Id. at 236. 
236 Id. at 236 (citing Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245 (1961)). 
237 Id. (citing Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Broadcast Stations, 32 Radio Reg. 2d (P & F) 
954, 1015–17 (1975) (Robinson, Comm’r, concurring in part, dissenting in part)). 
238 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, Learned, J.) (quoted in 
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institutional power do not necessarily lead to socially reflected values on “what amount 
and kind of diversity would be best.”239  The First Amendment “does not require any set 
amount of diversity in the marketplace.”240   
¶86 Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt recently reinforced the view that diverse 
speech and viewpoints are not in short supply on the Internet.  In a speech at Columbia 
University, Hundt noted the explosion in diverse perspectives, access, viewpoints, and 
communications by “every language” and “every race” with the emergence of a 
“disintermediating medium as opposed to broadcast that created intermediaries.”241  In 
more detail, he remarked:  
¶87 [The Internet was] certain to be diverse in every conceivable respect and not by dint 
of regulation—diverse, meaning it would be in every language and every race would be 
welcome and the content would be . . . generated by people who . . . would choose any 
points of view; and any kind of ownership of the content would be admissible and any 
form of the content would be possible.242 
¶88 Rather than requiring a government regulatory agency to license and predetermine 
diversity with representative access for speakers to speak, the Internet allows creative and 
expressive individuals to enter the marketplace of ideas, find audiences, and win 
influence based upon the merits of their content and business savvy.243  If particular 
speakers are being heard or distributed by shrinking audiences, notably traditional 
journalists, it is because users have freedom to select among a wider marketplace of 
speech.244   
 
Daniel L. Brenner, Toward a True Marketplace for the Marketplace of Ideas, in FREE BUT REGULATED, 
CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW 272, 276 (Daniel L. Brenner & William L. Rivers eds., 1982)). 
239 EMORD, supra note 230, at 219, 228 (exploring structural regulation starting with the Associated 
Press case, and the never-ending quest for diversity). 
240 Id. 
241 Reed Hundt, Chairman, FCC, Speech at Columbia Business School: The End of Broadcasting (Mar. 
11, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqgDEbPe9CI.  See also CBS Media Player, COLUMBIA 
BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/flash/CBSPlay-
append.html?video1=centers/CITI/lunch-speaker_3-11-2010.flv. 
242 See generally Harry A. Jessell, Hundt Comes Clean: Internet Trumps TV, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 12, 
2010), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2010/03/12/daily.4/. (emphasis added). 
243 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“[I]t has long been a basic tenet of 
national communications policy that the widest dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”).  Learned Hand remarked: 
[Disseminating news from different sources] is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, 
the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes the right conclusions are more 
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.  To many this is, and always will be folly, but we have staked upon it our all. 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372 (Hand, Learned, J.). 
244 Krattenmaker and Powe explain: 
Even if the governmental policy is designed to and does promote diversity, the government 
may not coerce publication of information.  People may read what they choose and believe 
what they choose, and government’s duty is simply to leave those choices in private hands.  
Because people are free to choose, competition arises for their choices.  The array of 
available options—from mainstream to counter-cultural newspapers, magazines, books, or 
film—reflect the well-understood fact that speakers must actively compete for an audience.  
Society’s goal is to have a well-functioning market or forum of ideas, information, and 
entertainment, not to have each speaker within the forum perform as a microcosm of the 
whole (even if the speaker were capable of doing so). 
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 5, at 177. 
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¶89 And whether the diet of information and journalist consumption of a citizen is 
healthy is not an area that lends itself neatly to regulatory influence.245  Lucas Powe 
describes the principle: “Indeed, our traditions are clear.  A fair press, as determined by a 
government mechanism, is not a free press.”246  Professor Powe continues, “[a] free press 
may be fair; we hope it will not be irresponsible; but . . . for the press to serve as a check 
on the government it must be free to gather and report information about government and 
those who do or would govern.”247  A clerk for Justice Douglas, Professor Powe 
remarked, “[t]hat fairness would not have a First Amendment pedigree is not 
surprising.”248 
D. Raised Eyebrow Enforcement 
¶90 The year following his seminal journal article, Judge Bazelon continued his critique 
in a per curiam opinion that addressed the “sub rosa bureaucratic hassling”249 and 
“denouement”250 that arose from “raised eyebrow” enforcement at the FCC.251  In Illinois 
Citizens Committee, a radio broadcaster challenged an FCC fine against radio broadcasts 
that expanded traditional telephone talk shows to cover discussions on sexual relations.252  
In 1973, the FCC decided to censor the content through a closed notice of inquiry into 
allegations of obscene or indecent material.253  However, the timing of events indicated 
that a critical speech made by the Commission Chairman at a National Association of 
Broadcasters convention was meant to render the formal action moot by “raising an 
eyebrow” in order for the broadcasters to voluntarily comply.254   
¶91 Judge Bazelon refers to this sentiment as “denouement,” quoting an anonymous 
broadcaster: “You have to understand, . . . [we] are a member of a group that operates a 
number of stations and are going to cable TV, and our growth depends on F.C.C. 
approval.  We live or die still by the F.C.C. gun.”255  Judge Bazelon noted the “pervasive 
regulatory scheme” under which the FCC administered “raised eyebrow” enforcement.256   
 
245 Robinson, Let Them Eat Broccoli, supra note 165. 
246 Powe, Tornillo, supra note 101, at 384. 
247 Id. 
248 Id.  See also id. at 387 (“Tribe rightly warns that access regulation in the print media would be seen 
as a ‘profound break’ with tradition, transforming ‘the boundaries of the legally thinkable and [creating] a 
corresponding increase in pressure to regulate still more deeply.’”) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 700 (1978)); Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: 
Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1976) (“[A] vigorously 
enforced fairness doctrine, may lead to utter blandness of content and in this way may permit official 
manipulation of the news.”). 
249 Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
250 Id. 
251 Id.  “The heart of the case lies in the realities of the relationship between the Federal 
Communications Commission and radio licensees.”  Id.  “One first notes a pervasive regulatory scheme in 
which the licensees are dependent on the FCC and the government for their economic well-being.”  Id.  
“The main threat is, of course, that the government can put a licensee out of business but I suppose that the 
more pervasive threat lies in the sub rosa bureaucratic hassling which the Commission can impose on the 
licensee . . . .”  Id.  
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 408. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 409 
256 Id. at 425. 
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¶92 The raised eyebrow constitutes a signaling mechanism that is designed to be non-
transparent.  This is itself hostile to the public interest.  The process rests on the fact that 
the regulator has the power to deny license renewals based on vague standards, namely 
the Commission’s interpretation of what the public interest is.  The agency rarely denies 
license renewals, owing to the fact that the sanction is so draconian—literally, the death 
penalty for a broadcast station—that it need only be threatened.  Agency officials are able 
to express their demands on station owners without making public statements specifying 
the actual rules.  Licensees are keen to meet such demands so as to avoid not only 
possible license non-renewal but also the high costs of hearings and a legal defense 
should the process drag on past pro forma renewal.  Hence, the system constitutes a 
devil’s playground—run by lobbyists, interested parties, and policy insiders, invisible to 
courts, the press, or the voting public.    
¶93 While recognizing the existence of “innuendo,” Bazelon called for the courts to be 
more demanding in their analysis and principled in their judicial review, avoiding the 
proverbial slippery slope.257  Courts have a unique role in moderating this area of 
regulation, given the licensing regime in place:  
And it might well be that the root problem is . . . the very existence of a 
comprehensive scheme for the licensing of speakers . . . .  [S]ince it is impossible 
to sweep away the licensing scheme and its predicate of scarcity without 
Congressional action, the task of the courts must be to vigilantly oversee FCC 
administration of the regulatory scheme to eliminate the various “chilling effects” 
of that scheme, no matter how difficult the role of overseer may be.258 
The threat of regulation is a subtle strain on freedom from regulatory coercion, even if 
blatant censorship remains distasteful.  “Obvious censorship still retains a bad name in 
our society.  If we are to have government censorship, it must not be aboveboard: it’s got 
to be out of sight.  That is how we accommodate our traditions.”259  In a political 
environment, “[t]hat is how Mayflower and Red Lion work: not by Commission action or 
judicial review, but by threat, pure and simple.  [President] Nixon’s head of the Office of 
Telecommunications Policy, T. Clay Whitehead, put it best: ‘The value of the sword of 
Damocles is that it hangs, not falls.’”260 
¶94 Although the Nixon administration and its complicated relationship with the press 
is largely relegated to historical inquiry,261 the structures that allow for such chilling 
effects are still in place today.  In January 2010, a judge on the Second Circuit recently 
remarked in oral argument that under current policy, the FCC would amount to a “roving 
band of censors” without the ability to give prescriptive guidance on what would or 




259 POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 5, at 120. 
260 Id. (emphasis added). 
261 Id. at 121 (describing the Nixon assault on the networks, particularly the administration’s campaign 
against “liberal eastern” media, network television, and The Washington Post’s broadcast holdings). 
262 Oral Argument, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010) (06-1760-ag).  See 
Mark Hamblett, 2nd Circuit Judges Challenge FCC Policy on Penalizing 'Fleeting Expletives' on TV, 
N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437948633&rss=newswire.  
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VI. DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE PRESS 
¶95 During the Red Lion era, the Nixon administration, the Democratic National 
Committee, and the small, regional radio station of Red Lion, Pennsylvania, tested the 
limits of the First Amendment.  Much in the same way, the political and media landscape 
of 2010 invites new intersections of political advocacy, digital speech, and freedom. 
¶96 Over the last few terms, the Supreme Court has taken note of critical junctures in 
our democracy where technology and the First Amendment meet.263  In a concurrence in 
Fox Television, Justice Thomas aptly juxtaposed over-the-air broadcasting speech with 
“telephone dial-in services . . . cable television programming . . . and the Internet.”264  He 
quoted former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth: “It is ironic that streaming 
video or audio content from a television or radio station would likely receive more 
constitutional protection than would the same exact content broadcast over-the-air.”265   
¶97 Digital diversity has proliferated since the Commissioner’s statement.266  Evolving 
media platforms are pulling whole sectors of news and information into their 
gravitational orbit.  The central role of journalism combines free speech267 with the daily 
reality that business models must realign to form new distribution platforms.268  The Pew 
Research Center’s Center for Excellence in Journalism notes the change in the media 
landscape.  Six out of ten executives feel the Internet is “changing the fundamental values 
 
263 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (concerning an on-demand political 
movie); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (concerning animal cruelty, crush videos); FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (concerning indecency on Super Bowl); City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) (concerning text messages on an employee’s telephone). 
264 Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1821. 
265 Id. 
266 The online video ranking provider, comScore, found:    
More than 180 million viewers watched an average of 173 videos per viewer during the 
month of March.  Google Sites attracted 136.0 million unique viewers during the month (96.0 
videos per viewer), followed by Yahoo! Sites with 56.2 million viewers (8.5 videos per 
viewer) and CBS Interactive with 46.7 million viewers (9.8 videos per viewer). . . .  84.8 
percent of the total U.S. Internet audience viewed online video. . . .  The duration of the 
average online video was 4.3 minutes. 
Press Release, comScore, March 2010 U.S. Online Video Rankings (April 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/4/comScore_Releases_March_2010_U.S._O
nline_Video_Rankings.  BusinessWeek also explained:   
Advertisers say Google TV will let them reach TV viewers faster, more cheaply, and more 
effectively than via traditional TV spots.  With Google, advertisers will know exactly who 
viewed their ad, how many people clicked on it, and how many people chose to use a "click-
to-call" feature to contact advertisers immediately. 
Olga Kharif, Advertisers Give Google TV a Warm Reception, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 24, 
2010), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2010/tc20100523_438614.htm.   
267 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, xix (1993) (“[T]he 
possibility that government controls on the broadcast media, designed to ensure diversity of view and 
attention to public affairs, would help the system of free expression.”).  For a critique of this view, see 
Thomas Hazlett, The Dual Role of Property Rights in Protecting Broadcast Speech, in PROBLEMS OF 
MARKET LIBERALISM 176, 177 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1998).   
268 Kurt Wimmer, Digital Journalism: The Audience Is Here.  But Who’s Monetizing the Content, Policy 
Views, THE MEDIA INSTITUTE, June 2010, available at 
http://www.mediainstitute.org/new_site/PDFs/Policy-Views-5-Wimmer-6-8-10.pdf. 
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of journalism,” where “their biggest concern is loosening standards of accuracy and 
verification, much of it tied to the immediacy of the Web.”269   
¶98 News executives, however, are “overwhelmingly skeptical about the prospect of 
government financing.”270  Furthermore, one broadcast news executive remarked, 
“[o]utside funding options are a bad idea overall . . . .  They are being used to ‘save’ old 
models of journalism that are no longer economically viable and will die out over time no 
matter what.”271  Despite reservations about the state of journalism today, the spirit of a 
free press resides in fierce independence from government involvement, whether 
benevolent, neutral, or malevolent.  The report notes: “Fully 75% of news executives 
have serious reservations about receiving government subsidies, and 78% have 
significant resistance to financing from interest groups. Roughly half have significant 
worries about funds from government tax credits and more than a third have significant 
doubts about private donations.”272   
¶99 The press, as the storyteller of government activity, citizen involvement, and as a 
commentator for the public interest, operates to provide higher quality content.  One 
scholar notes this reality: “A concentrated, homogenized press will over report some 
stories and underreport (or ignore) others to the detriment of us all.”273  Doctrinal bright 
lines organize the freedoms of speakers, in light of their relationship to the government, 
other journalistic ventures, and changing distribution networks.274  The Court required 
strict scrutiny upon government involvement by drawing a bright line in Tornillo, which 
retains ever-important significance today.275   
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶100 Content regulation, archaic as the concept may seem in an Internet age of abundant 
speech, remains subject to resurrection through Red Lion.  The logic behind the scarcity 
doctrine was never valid and was merely a thinly veiled political excuse to regulate 
communications while skirting the First Amendment.  There is no basis for distinguishing 
media content by the roads it travels.  Today that exercise has become a fool’s errand.  Is 
the New York Times transmitted via a Sprint 3G network to a Kindle deserving of the 
newspaper freedoms, or is the public interest dictated by frequency scarcity?  The 
 
269 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, News Executives, Skeptical of 
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convergence of print and wireless makes the emptiness of the scarcity doctrine 
emptiness-squared. 
¶101 The Supreme Court and FCC should leap at the opportunity to straighten out the 
law.  Logical contradictions are myriad when modern issues arise.  If the Red Lion 
reasoning enables content regulation for some speech, we are caught in a dangerous game 
of impressionistic case-by-case determinations on which platforms are protected with full 
“free speech” and which are not.  It is perverse that as information flow dramatically 
expands, “scarcity” rationales might grow and grow right alongside.  But that is the 
problem with the central premise on which Red Lion resides. 
